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Abstract 
In December 1977, the Liberal government of Pierre Elliot Trudeau authorized the 
Department of National Defence (DND) to begin the acquisition of new warships for the navy. 
The decision to acquire fully combat capable warships was a shocking decision which marked 
the conclusion of a remarkable turnaround in Canadian defence policy. The navy, which had 
grown into a substantial and capable force during the early Cold War in the 1950s, had been in a 
steady decline since the mid-1960s as a result of the shifts in defence policy, cuts in personnel, 
and still deeper cuts to the capital funding needed to replace the many aging ships in the fleet. 
Furthermore, the government’s priority was the peacetime enforcement of Canadian laws and 
regulations, a role that could be carried out more efficiently by lightly armed vessels. The 
fulfillment of the nation’s wartime NATO responsibilities, which required the substantially more 
capable ship that it chose to acquire instead, was a secondary concern for the Trudeau 
government. Nevertheless, it opted to acquire fully combat capable warships for both military 
and political reasons. This marked the beginning of the largest procurement project in the 
country’s history, and one that was both innovative and successful. The result was a contract for 
six state-of-the art frigates, which was awarded to Saint John Shipbuilding (SJSDD), a shipyard 
based in Saint John, New Brunswick, in August 1983. 
The Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) program was certainly a much belated and necessary 
effort to save the navy from “rust out.” As this thesis argues, however, political considerations 
well beyond those pertinent to the formulation of Canada’s defence policy were critically 
important in the bold decisions to procure sophisticated warships, and, moreover, to design and 
build them in Canada at a time when the necessary expertise had been severely eroded by the 
long hiatus in warship construction. In a democratic society such as Canada, which has a 
 
 
IV 
 
particularly strong tradition of civilian supremacy over the military, politics and defence matters 
are inseparable. The political leadership not only controls the objectives of the armed forces, but 
also the means to achieve them. Unsurprisingly, military procurement programs, with the large 
economic spinoffs at stake, are fraught with political interference in most nations. The CPFs 
were no exception, as this thesis will demonstrate through an examination of both the military 
and political developments leading to the acquisition of the ships, and the method of their design 
and construction. The program was born and shaped by the intersection of defence requirements 
and the political interest of Cabinet to muster the support of the electorate by stimulating 
economic development in ways that would both modernize domestic industries and bolster 
employment in the less prosperous regions in the country. 
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Introduction  
On December 22, 1977, the Pierre Elliot Trudeau government announced its decision to 
acquire six new frigates for the Canadian Armed Forces. This announcement initiated the 
Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) program, which ultimately delivered twelve state-of-the-art 
vessels for Maritime Command (MARCOM) at a final cost of $8.856 billion.1 To this day, it 
remains the single most expensive military procurement project in Canadian history.2 The 
acquisition of these new warships within the planned budget was a sorely-needed victory for not 
only MARCOM, which desperately needed new ships to replace its obsolete fleet, but also for 
the military procurement system, which has been and continues to be characterized by critics and 
frustrated participants alike as inefficient and incompetent. To the casual observer, the 
acquisition of equipment for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) should not be an overly complex 
task as it ought to be an exercise of matching the needs of the military with the proper 
equipment. However, this simplistic view discounts the constant interference throughout the 
process by political interests, which are the true cause of the deficiencies that plagues Canada’s 
procurement system, and indeed, one which plagued most governments which endeavour to 
manage large defence procurement programs that features cutting-edge technology. As this thesis 
will demonstrate, the acquisition of the warships, while initiated to meet pressing military needs, 
was ultimately driven by political considerations.  
In a democratic country such as Canada, understanding the complex relationship between 
politics and defence matters is paramount if one is to make sense of how military procurement 
programs are initiated and carried out. After all, politicians not only control the objectives of the 
 
1 DND. CPF Project Completion Report. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005): 20.  
2 The Canadian Surface Combatant project, which is currently ongoing is expected to cost up to $60 billion, making 
it the new most expensive procurement project in Canadian history.  
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CAF but also the means to achieve them. The choices of equipment procured for the military are 
seldom driven by military requirements alone, but rather by compromise between military and 
political needs. This is the result of the often-incongruent interests of the two main stakeholders: 
the CAF and Cabinet. The former is concerned with the security and defence of the nation while 
the latter is preoccupied with a larger range of considerations such as interprovincial relations, 
industrial development, and the socio-economic wellbeing of the nation and its citizens. There 
will always be a need for new equipment for the military as existing systems wear out or become 
obsolete, together with the constantly evolving geopolitical landscape and the emergence of new 
threats. However, the fierce competition for funding within the bureaucracy as well as the 
relatively low priority of defence spending in most Canadian governments meant that major 
procurement programs only occurred when the needs of the military and Cabinet converged. Yet, 
to characterize defence procurement as the mere product of a marriage of intersecting needs 
between the military and political leadership underscores both the complexity of these projects, 
and the marked importance of political considerations.  
The long timespan of the CPF program (1977-2006) means that it is impossible to 
examine the entirety of the project within this thesis. Instead, this analysis will focus on the 
Project Definition phase for the initial six vessels which largely took place from 1977 to 1983. 
To understand why the procurement took place, and how the innovative features of the program 
such as a heavier reliance on civilian industry than previous warship projects came to be, it is 
essential to examine the military and political developments which led to the government’s 
decision to acquire the vessels (Chapters One to Three).  
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The thesis seeks to address two main questions: 1) how did the military formulate its 
requirement for the frigates and 2) why did the Pierre Trudeau government proceed with the 
project? The first question has led to an examination of how the military came to lay down the 
specifications for the new vessels, and how DND presented the case for these warships to 
Cabinet (Chapter Four). In responding to the second question, the thesis explores how political 
considerations that were largely domestic in nature not only persuaded the government to 
proceed with the procurement of the Canadian Patrol Frigates in 1977, but also continued to 
shape the program long afterward (Chapter Five).  
This work is comprised of five largely chronological chapters. Chapter One will examine 
the rise and fall of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in the post-World War II era up to Pierre 
Trudeau’s election as prime minister in 1968. From one of the largest fleets in the world in 1945, 
the RCN was reduced to a shadow of its former self only twenty-five short years later. In 1970, 
the Canadian fleet totaled only twenty-four major surface combat vessels, the majority of which 
were nearing the end of their service life and more concerning were operationally obsolete. 
During the intervening decades, the rapid expansion of the Soviet submarine fleet forced the 
RCN to adopt an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) orientation and set the navy down a course from 
which there would be no return. However, the greatest threats to the RCN were not under the 
waves but rather in the halls of Parliament in Ottawa. Political apathy and the need to free up 
funds for other government priorities led first to the integration of the armed forces and 
subsequently, the Unification Crisis, which resulted in enormous upheavals in the Canadian 
military establishment. By the time Trudeau imposed further changes on the armed forces during 
his first administration (1968-1972) the ability of Canada’s maritime service to fulfill its core 
functions was already in question. The arrival of the four DDH-280 Iroquois-class destroyers and 
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the Protecteur-class Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AOR) ships in the early 1970s brought a 
glimmer of hope, but the outlook of Canada’s maritime forces remained very bleak as the new 
prime minister had a radically different vision for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).  
Chapter Two follows Trudeau’s early efforts to re-invent Canada’s defence and foreign 
policies. Trudeau had made it clear from the beginning that he was not a strong supporter of the 
military, NATO, or the policies adopted by his predecessor.3 This quickly created a rift between 
Canada and its allies, who saw his pursuit of new nationalist priorities and the proposed drastic 
reconfiguration of the armed forces as signs that the nation would abandon its alliance 
responsibilities.4 Yet by 1975, when Trudeau had his now famous meeting with the West 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, there was a clear reversal of policy as Canada once again 
embraced its participation in the NATO alliance. This shift, while largely a political decision, 
demonstrated Trudeau’s maturity as he learned of the value that a capable and competent 
military had to the advancement of Canadian interests and policies beyond just defence and 
foreign relations matters.5 In the wake of this revelation, several major capital equipment 
programs were initiated which resulted in the acquisition of the C1 Leopard tanks, the CF-188 
Hornet fighter, CP-140 Aurora long-range patrol aircraft and, last, the Canadian Patrol Frigates.6  
Chapter three analyses the new world which Maritime Command (MARCOM), the 
successor to the RCN, found itself in 1975 as the government initiated the Ship Replacement 
Program (SRP). While the navy endured far-reaching organizational changes and cuts to 
 
3 Robert Bothwell and Jack Granastein, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1990), 8-9. 
4 Ibid, 28.  
5 Frank Maas, The Price of Alliance: The Politics and Procurement of Leopard Tanks for Canada’s NATO Brigade, 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 91. 
6 While more commonly known as the CF-18 Hornet, the official designation of the fighter is CF-188.  
Ma 5 
 
 
 
personnel and capital budgets during the 1960s and early 1970s, the international strategic 
situation which it was still tasked to protect Canadian maritime interests in was evolving rapidly. 
In 1954, USS Nautilus, the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) entered service with 
the US Navy (USN). This development sparked a new arms race between the USA and the 
USSR fuelled by the proliferation of naval nuclear technology. The introduction of SSNs and 
later their nuclear ballistic missile armed variants, SSBNs, revolutionized naval warfare and 
indeed the strategic balance between the West and the Soviet Bloc. Canada’s warships were 
outmatched by these new threats and quickly became operationally obsolete. The nuclear 
problem was further exacerbated by the massive expansion of the Soviet Navy during the 1960s. 
While these were not problems with which Canada alone had to contend, they nevertheless had 
significant implications for MARCOM. It was against this backdrop that the longstanding 
funding problems of the CAF once again resurfaced. Trudeau had no alternative but to initiate a 
comprehensive review of Canada’s military roles, capabilities, force structure, and funding 
formula to address the inadequacies of the CAF. At the end of the 1975 Defence Structure 
Review, Cabinet ordered the Department of National Defence (DND) to begin the foundational 
work for a ship replacement program.  
Chapter four examines the DND’s difficult journey to craft the Statement of 
Requirements (SOR) for its newest warships. Compounding the woes of defence officials was 
MARCOM’s twin roles which required very different types of vessels to fulfill.7 The sovereignty 
role assigned by the government was best served by lightly armed patrol vessels while Canada’s 
NATO responsibilities could only be met by proper warships. These competing requirements 
 
7 “Discussion Paper – Maritime Forces Surface Requirements (DND-8-77DP),” Vol 74, File 11, 19, Barney Danson 
Fonds, R13905-1415-0-E, Library and Archives Canada. [Hereafter LAC].  
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resulted in intense debates both within the military and in Cabinet over how the SRP should 
proceed. Ultimately, after two long years of preparatory studies, it was decided that Canada 
would procure a new combat frigate. However, the experience of previous DND-administered 
procurement projects resulted in a deep mistrust of the military’s ability to carry out such 
programs. In response, a new procurement strategy was implemented to ensure the problems of 
the past did not resurface. This was the first step in the long journey to acquire MARCOM’s new 
warships.  
The final chapter seeks to understand why the government approved of the CPF project. 
Just several years prior, the idea that the Trudeau government would instigate a procurement 
program to acquire a class of ASW frigates would have been unfathomable. However, the 
decision to proceed with the project, despite the clear military needs, was made largely based on 
political considerations. The Trudeau government was eager to use the CPF project to promote 
economic, industrial and technological growth in Canada. Two areas of particular interest to the 
government were the fledgling electronics sector and the deeply troubled shipbuilding industry. 
The emphasis on economic and industrial development meant that the distribution of industrial 
and regional benefits (IRB) became a major source of contention within Trudeau’s cabinet as 
well as among the provinces and relevant stakeholders. After much deliberation, Saint John 
Shipbuilding (SJSDD) was announced as the victor of the CPF competition on June 29, 1983, 
thereby ending the Project Definition phase of the program. By all measures, the procurement of 
the Canadian Patrols Frigates was a highly successful event, especially given the strategic and 
political complexities which DND faced. 
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Chapter 0.1 – Literature Review 
 This thesis occupies a unique place in the study of the procurement of the Canadian 
Patrol Frigates as it constitutes the first major study on the topic, which made this project both an 
exciting and daunting task. While military procurement in Canada is not a new topic in 
academia, most of the existing literature comprises contemporary studies which either examine 
procurement projects as part of the defence policies of the day or are commentaries about the 
failures of a procurement system. 8 While they provide valuable context, these publications are 
largely written by political scientists and defence commentators, who do not have access to the 
project files and papers of participants which historians enjoy. In other words, the values of these 
commentaries and analysis decreases with the passage of time as archived sources are opened for 
research.  
In the past two decades, there have been several substantial works on the influence of 
politics on military procurement. Michael Hennessey’s PhD thesis, "The Rise and Fall of a 
Canadian Maritime Policy, 1939-1965" (1999) specifically focused on the hopes of political 
leaders to build on the large emergency shipbuilding program during World War II for post-war 
economic development. Aaron Plamondon’s, The Politics of Procurement: Military Acquisition 
in Canada and the Sea King Helicopter (2010) was a more tightly focused study of the interplay 
of military and political influences on the Canadian military procurement system. This was 
followed by Cold War Fighters: Canadian Aircraft Procurement, 1945-54 (2011) by Randall 
Wakelam, and Frank Maas’ The Price of Alliance: The Politics and Procurement of Leopard 
 
8 Peter Haydon, “Choosing the Right Fleet Mix: Lessons from the Canadian Patrol Frigate Selection Process,” 
Canadian Military Journal 9, No.1 (2008): 65.  
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Tanks for Canada’s NATO Brigade (2018). This thesis seeks to add to this growing 
historiography with an examination of the CPF program. 
Aaron Plamondon’s The Politics of Procurement and Frank Maas’ The Price of Alliance 
were particularly influential in the development of the present thesis. Plamondon’s work 
chronicled the acquisition of the CH-124 Sea King helicopter in 1960 and the various political 
controversies which dogged both that project as well as the various later attempts to procure a 
modern replacement. While the topic of this study was largely unrelated to this thesis, it 
demonstrated the importance of politics to military procurement, showing in detail how the 
procurement of helicopters for the navy was used as a tool to achieve political objectives. Maas’ 
The Price of Alliance examined the procurement of the C1 Leopard Tanks for the Canada’s 
brigade stationed in West Germany by Pierre Trudeau in the early 1970s and was more directly 
related to the CPF program, which was also initiated by the Trudeau government in the mid 
1970s. Maas argued that Trudeau’s decision to procure the tanks, which he was adamantly 
opposed to several years prior despite extensive efforts by defence officials to convince him of 
the need for modern tanks, was effectively a political transaction in order to secure closer trade 
relations with the European Economic Community (EEC). 
For broader context on the history of Canada’s navy and defence policy, the existing 
historiography is substantial. Marc Milner’s Canada’s Navy: The First Century and Nicholas 
Tracy’s A Two-Edge Sword: The Navy as an Instrument of Canadian Foreign Policy, The Naval 
Service of Canada 1910-2010, A Centennial Story, edited by Richard Gimblett, and RCN in 
Transition, 1910-1985 are four of the most notable publications on the history of Canada’s 
maritime service and were indispensable for chapters one, two and three as they treat the 
evolution of Canada’s maritime force from the post-World War II era to when the CPFs were 
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announced in 1977. Sharon Hobson’s The Composition of Canada’s Naval Fleet, 1946-85 
provided specific information on the classes of warships that made up Canada’s fleet. Paul 
Hellyer’s memoir, Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces, was an 
invaluable source for Chapter 1.2 as it detailed the important events of 1963 to 1968 from the 
former defence minister’s perspective. Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants by Dan 
Middlemiss and Joel Sokolsky was a valuable piece which provided a detailed overview of the 
development of Canada’s defence policies during the Cold War.  
On the topic of Pierre Trudeau’s defence and foreign policy during the 1970s, Pirouette 
by Jack Granatstein and Robert Bothwell remains the authoritative work. The Canadian Way by 
Pierre Trudeau and Ivan Head supplies the perspective of the prime minister and his chief 
advisor. Larry Stewart’s Canada’s European Force, 1971-1980: A Defence Policy in Transition 
is valuable on Trudeau’s defence policy with respect to NATO. Colin Gray’s Canada’s Maritime 
Forces is a detailed contemporary analysis of the changes to the priorities of MARCOM in the 
government’s white paper Defence in the 70s. The Naval Service of Canada 1910-2010, A 
Centennial Story and RCN in Transition, 1910-1985, are two collection of essays edited by 
Richard Gimblett and W.A.B. Douglas respectively which contain a number of articles from 
important contributors such as Joel Sokolsky, Peter Haydon, Dan Middlemiss and Michael 
Hennessey. The Canadian Defence Quarterly which was the CF’s professional journal, 
published a number of articles that were particularly useful in highlighting differing views 
among serving naval officers on the future roles and capabilities of the service.  
The lack of readily available published sources on the details of the CPF program made it 
a challenge to initially piece together a cohesive narrative of the events which ultimately led to 
the decision to build the first six Canadian Patrol Frigates. Fortunately, there are large collections 
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of relevant material at Library and Archives Canada (LAC), the Department of National 
Defence’s Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), and the Laurier Centre for Military, 
Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LMCSDS). The majority of source documents used in this 
thesis were obtained from these depositories. Many of the documents at LAC and DHH had to be 
acquired through the Access to Information program (ATIP).  
One of the most important collections is the George Lindsey Fonds, parts of which are 
located at DHH and parts at LCMSDS. Lindsey, a physicist and key DND analyst in the 
development of Canada’s defence policy, was a long-time member of the Defence Research 
Board, and ultimately head of the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment.9 Important 
documents from his collection include: “Memo to Cabinet: Financing the Defence Program from 
1975/76 - 1979-80” (October 13, 1974), “Strategic Trends of the 70s and their Implications for 
Canadian Defence Policy” (May 20, 1970) and “Canadian Defence Policy in the 70s” (May 
1969) all of which were critical for chapter three. Other key documents found at DHH included 
the “Canadian Patrol Frigate Program: Project Definition Stage Procurement Plan” (1978) and 
the “CPF Project Completion Report.” (2005).  
A second major source of primary documents came from LAC, where the Pierre Trudeau 
Fonds, the Barney Danson Fonds, the Romeo LeBlanc Fonds and the Cabinet Conclusion Fonds 
were especially useful. From the files of Barney Danson, the minister of National Defence when 
the procurement of the CPFs began, the two most important documents were a copy of Ivan 
Head’s “Canadian Defence Policy: A Study” (1969) and the DND Discussion Paper “Maritime 
Forces Surface Requirements.”(1977) Head’s report, as will be seen in Chapter Two, was 
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essentially the basis for Canada’s early defence policy under Trudeau and was instrumental to 
the formulation of the 1970 White Paper on Defence. The “Maritime Forces Surface 
Requirements” was a discussion paper presented to cabinet by DND which presented the 
military’s full case for new warships and outlined how the procurement of these vessels would 
be conducted. Its importance cannot be overstated as much of Chapter Four was written based on 
this set of documents. Romeo LeBlanc was the minister of Public Works when the contract for 
the CPFs was awarded in 1983. In the collection is a series of memos which detailed the 
assessment of the final bids from the competing consortia. This set of documents clearly 
highlight the importance which the Trudeau government placed on regional and industrial 
benefits in the decision to procure the Canadian Patrol Frigates. Due to time constraints and the 
Coronavirus Pandemic, the documents examined in this thesis constituted only a small portion of 
those held in various archives across Canada. These collections present an opportunity for future 
historians to further study the politics of military procurement in Canada. 
Chapter 0.2 - Military Procurement in Canada 
The distinguished historian David Bercuson once stated, “of all the interesting, dramatic, 
exciting aspects of defence policy and military operations, none is more dull than procurement. 
The very word seems to induce boredom.”10 However, for those who enjoy the intrigues of 
politics, procurement programs are fascinating because they provide valuable insights into the 
inner workings of government, especially how defence policies are often guided by 
considerations that are non-military in nature. Canada’s procurement system has long been 
described as nothing short of a national tragedy due to its consistent inability to deliver quality 
 
10 David Bercuson, “Time to wake up on procurement,” Legion Magazine, (November 2005). 
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equipment in a timely and affordable manner.11 Notable failures such as the Avro Arrow and the 
numerous attempts to replace the Sea King helicopters represent the epitome of the flawed 
procurement system. Even projects considered to be successful such the CF-100 Canuck fighter 
and the DDH 205 St. Laurent- class destroyers, were dogged by significant cost overruns and 
lengthy delays. The acquisition of the Canadian Patrol Frigates, the topic of this thesis, took an 
astounding fifteen years from the initiation of the project to when the lead ship was 
commissioned into the fleet. This was double the accepted norm for a major shipbuilding 
program. While the procurement of military equipment had never been smooth in Canada, the 
intervention of political interests, exacerbated by the civilianization of the process created the 
nightmarish system in place today. 
There was a time when the Canadian military was responsible for the procurement of its 
own equipment. The Department of Defence Production (DDP) was created in April 1951 as the 
primary agency responsible for defence procurements due to the unique nature of such 
purchases. However, this arrangement was short-lived as the department was dissolved in 1963 
in the aftermath of the Glassco Commission on the consolidation of government services. The 
procurement of military equipment then became the responsibility of the Department of Industry, 
Trade and Commerce (DOI) and later, the Department of Supply and Services (DSS). The end of 
an independent military procurement agency, ostensibly to eliminate redundancy in government 
services and to restore accountability, had severe consequences for the Canadian Forces. 
The foremost problem which resulted from the civilianization of the military procurement 
system was that meeting the needs of the armed forces was no longer the prime directive of the 
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projects. Instead, this was superseded by political considerations that originated from Cabinet. 
Canada’s military procurement system is unique in that all defence-related goods and services 
are required by law to be acquired through a competitive selection process.12 This was done to 
ensure both transparency as well as to determine the most cost-effective option which met the 
CAF’s requirements. However, this arrangement also allowed Cabinet to control the distribution 
of industrial and regional benefits (IRB), which as this thesis will demonstrate, was used to 
achieve political objectives which are non-military in nature. Furthermore, of the many parties 
involved, only DND was concerned with the actual capabilities of the equipment; considerations 
such as costs and IRB distribution were more important than the actual capabilities of the 
equipment for Cabinet and other government departments involved.13 As civilian priorities 
overtook those of the military, the equipment procured in many instances was not the best option 
for the armed force’s requirements, but rather, the best compromise between military and 
political needs. 
The second problem which stemmed from the civilianization of the defence procurement 
process was that the relationship between DND and DSS had become muddled. 14 Unlike most 
other nations where the military or a designated agency is responsible for such projects, 
procurements programs in Canada became a joint venture between the armed forces and other 
relevant government departments following the dissolution of the DDP.15 In theory, the 
Department of National Defence (DND) would be the lead agency in the procurement project 
 
12 Alan Williams, Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement: A View from the Inside. (Montreal and Kingston: 
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and be supported by officials from DOI and DSS who would manage aspects in which DND 
lacked experience such as contract negotiations and management of IRBs.16 In practice, this 
resulted in a highly complicated procurement system where DND remained as the project 
overseer but its functions were greatly reduced to that of technical authority and end user. 17 The 
real power was in the hands of DSS, which was responsible for the negotiation and management 
of the contract with the selected contractor. However, its officials possessed neither the requisite 
knowledge of the CAF’s needs nor understood the unique nature of these acquisitions. Instead, 
its focus was on the administration of the contract. More important, they were not held 
accountable for their actions.18 Despite the reduced role of DND, it was still responsible for any 
cost overrun and political baggage left behind by DSS. 
The effectiveness of this arrangement had been questioned as early as 1972. The DND 
Management Review Group raised two significant problems with the capital acquisition 
programs in its sweeping review of the senior management structure of the CAF/DND. The first 
was that there was no single official responsible for the many aspects of procurement such as but 
not limited to engineering, preparing the SOR and project management.19 This was easily 
resolved with the creation of the position of ADM (Mat) at the recently created National Defence 
Headquarters (NDHQ). The second problem dealt with the relationship between DND and DSS 
in defence procurement. The Management Review Group had significant doubts about the 
suitability of DSS as the lead agency in defence procurement given the unique natures of these 
purchases and its general lack of knowledge of the needs of the armed forces. The Management 
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Review Group Report (Pennefather Report) explicitly stated that “We also consider it 
inappropriate to allow other Government departments to have primary responsibilities for 
matters related to defence procurement as has been the case on occasions in the past. It 
represents a fundamental abdication of the Department’s responsibility, and the Auditor-
General’s criticisms have borne witness to this view.”20 Furthermore, the report stated that if 
DSS was to remain the lead agency for the acquisition of military equipment, there must be 
mechanisms in place to ensure that it, not DND, would be held responsible should the product 
fail to satisfy the needs of the armed forces or if its actions or inactions resulted in significant and 
costly delays.21 This recommendation was never acted upon as government departments 
jealously guarded their areas of responsibilities as fiefdoms under the pretext of accountability. 
As such, DSS remained the lead government department for defence procurement projects, a 
practice which continues to this day under its successor, Public Works and Government Services 
Canada.  
The decision to retain DSS as the lead agency in procurement projects ensured that in 
practice, there would be parallel chain of commands within the Project Management Office 
(PMO). While DND was in charge of the overall project, the departmental staff from DSS and 
DOI reported to their respective deputy ministers instead of the project manager. This meant that 
the Project Manager, nominally a military officer, had very little control over much of the 
procurement project. The new arrangement was highly flawed particularly when problems which 
intersected the responsibilities of multiple departments arose as these had to be dealt with at the 
 
20 John Pennefather was an executive of the Industrial Acceptance Corporation who was tasked to lead a committee 
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21 Ibid, 100. 
Ma 16 
 
 
 
deputy minister or ministerial level. This in turn led to lengthy delays to the already snail-paced 
procurement process. The civilianisation of the acquisition program exacerbated what originally 
was already a difficult defence procurement process. 
The Canadian government procurement process consists of nine major steps:22  
1. Defining the military requirements 
2. Validation of requirements 
3. Government approval and budget allotment 
4. Creating an official Statement of Requirement (SOR) 
5. Selection of procurement strategy 
6. Bid solicitation and source selection 
7. Negotiation and awarding of contract 
8. Administration of the contract 
9. Delivery of the product 
Although it appears to be logical, it fails to take into consideration the innumerable 
delays caused by political, legal and social-economic complications which have reduced the 
system to the ineffective bureaucratic nightmare it is today. Alan Williams, a former ADM (Mat) 
at DND, stated that a major reason for the lengthy delays in the procurement of new equipment 
for the Canadian Armed Forces are the politics associated with the process.23  
It is the responsibility of the prime minister and Cabinet to decide the defence and foreign 
policy direction of Canada which in turn dictated the roles and equipment requirements of the 
CAF. The acquisitions of major military capital equipment are highly visible and public events 
which spark considerable political scrutiny. They are particularly attractive targets for political 
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and interest groups given the high costs of these projects and the millions of dollars in IRB at 
stake.24 In most instances, the attacks are not necessarily about the particular equipment or 
weapon system being procured but rather the overarching defence and foreign policies adopted 
by the government of the day.25 This places significant pressure on the government not only to 
defend the equipment purchase, but also its overall defence policy. Failure to sufficiently justify 
the policy often resulted in even lengthier delays to the project and the longer it remained in the 
public eye, the more susceptible it was to attack and criticism.26 
The distribution of industrial and regional benefits was another political factor which 
greatly influenced defence procurement in Canada. IRBs are economic benefits which stemmed 
from government procurements and are mandatory for acquisitions valued at over $100 million. 
Furthermore, the value of IRB commitments is required to be at least equal to the value of the 
contract.27 The objective of the policy, formalized in 1986, was “to provide long-term industrial 
and regional benefits that are of high quality, provide long-lasting economic benefits, emphasize 
innovation and investments and pre-position Canadian industries for the export market and long-
term support.”28 However, The increased emphasis placed on IRB by politicians, only further 
exasperated the failures of an already dysfunctional system. These requirements drastically 
increased the cost of procurement programs to the point where Canada now pays several times 
more for a similar piece of equipment as other nations. The distributions of IRBs, as this thesis 
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will demonstrate later, are highly contentious political matters and politicians spend a great deal 
of time to ensure that their constituents benefit from government procurement projects.  
The flaws of Canada’s military procurement process are too numerous to be explained in 
detail in such a short summary. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the failures of the defence 
procurement process in Canada are systemic in nature and that politicians, defence officials and 
bureaucrats are all complicit. These themes, especially the politicization of the defence 
procurement process, will be further expanded upon in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 1: The Slow Demise of Canada’s Navy, 1945 – 1968 
“Our role in naval operations is definitely known…. It is antisubmarine work, largely in the waters across 
the North Atlantic and coastal protection on both coasts.”– Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence 
(June 9, 1950) 29 
The history of the Canadian navy in the post-World War II era was a tale of two navies. 
Whereas the 1950s represented the high point of the RCN, the 1960s was a decade of darkness. 
The demise of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and its successor, MARCOM, was not the result 
of a singular event which occurred overnight. Rather, it was the culmination of many years of 
institutional short-sightedness and political mismanagement. The objective of this chapter is to 
examine the slow demise of Canada’s naval service and to lay the foundation for the rest of the 
thesis as the RCN’s transition into a dedicated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) fleet would set 
into motion the events to come. At the end of the Second World War, plans were developed for 
Canada to maintain a versatile fleet which could perform a variety of missions and roles as 
needed. However, such plans went awry almost immediately as the strategic situation forced the 
RCN to adopt ASW as the primary mission. Though it did not resemble the one envisioned by 
naval planners in 1945, it was still nevertheless a highly effective fighting force and more 
importantly, the reorientation gave the navy a purpose as well as the justification needed to push 
for additional warships. As the 1950s came to a close, all seemed calm on the surface; however, 
trouble was brewing on the horizons. 
The election of the Liberal government in 1963 ushered in one of the darkest periods in 
Canadian military history as the venerable Lester B. Pearson tapped a young and ambitious MP 
by the name of Paul Hellyer to serve as the new Minister of National Defence (MND). Eager to 
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make his mark on the portfolio and to find savings to fund the ongoing expansion of the social 
welfare system, Hellyer forcibly merged the Canadian Army (CA), Royal Canadian Air Force 
(RCAF) and Royal Canadian Navy together into a new entity known as the Canadian Armed 
Forces. The ensuing crisis, known as the Unification Crisis, resulted in a protracted and highly 
public war between the military’s high command and the defence minister. In the end, Hellyer 
got his way and the three distinct elemental services ceased to exist. The navy, now reconstituted 
as Maritime Command, suffered heavily for leading the fight against unification. When Pierre 
Elliot Trudeau became prime minister in April 1968, he would take over a military that was a 
shell of its former self. 
Chapter 1.1 – The Development of Canada’s Cold War Navy, 1945-1963 
When the Second World War ended in August 1945, the Royal Canadian Navy was one 
of the largest naval forces in the world, comprising of over four hundred ships and ninety 
thousand sailors. Over the course of the conflict, it had gained a hard-earned reputation as an 
elite escort and ASW force. Despite its distinguished wartime record, Canada lacked the 
logistical, financial and manpower capability to maintain such an enormous fleet in peacetime 
and the drastic reduction of the navy was all but a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, plans were 
drafted to ensure that the RCN remained a formidable naval power as the world prepared to 
navigate the uncertainty of the Cold War. The envisioned post-war fleet would have consisted of 
two light aircraft carriers, five cruisers and three destroyer squadrons supported by other smaller 
support ships manned by approximately twenty thousand sailors.30 This configuration was 
designed to provide the RCN with the organizational and operational flexibility to undertake a 
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wide range of roles and operations. Unfortunately, those plans were quickly scuttled as fiscal and 
strategic realities of the post-World War II era quickly set in. 
The Cold War erupted immediately after the conclusion of the Second World War with 
the drawing of the Iron Curtain in Europe. Unlike the CA and the RCAF, the RCN initially 
struggled to define a role for itself in the new geopolitical landscape. Central Europe was 
expected to be the main battlefield of the East-West conflict. As a primarily land-based conflict, 
there was little use for a navy other than to escort the trans-Atlantic convoys necessary to sustain 
the war effort. This was however a low-intensity activity as the Soviet Navy was still in its 
infancy and posed little threat to the collective naval power of NATO. Unsurprisingly, while the 
CA and RCAF received the lion’s share of new equipment and personnel, the RCN was relegated 
to the forgotten service.31 As a result, the post-war fleet originally envisioned in 1945 never 
came into fruition. Instead, Canada’s navy was reduced by half and consisted of merely a single 
light carrier, two light cruisers and a dozen destroyers manned by ten thousand sailors in 1950.  
To counter the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union and its increasingly aggressive 
actions, Canada, the USA and other like-minded allies formed the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) on April 4, 1949. Realizing that, as individual nations, they lacked the 
resources to effectively counter the USSR, the goal of NATO was to deter Soviet aggression 
through collective defence. The RCN’s principle mission, derived from Articles 5 and 6 of the 
NATO Agreement, was to deter war with the Warsaw Pact through the presentation of a credible 
deterrence capability and pending the failure of this first objective, to maintain the sea line of 
communications (SLOC) between North America and Europe during times of tension and 
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hostilities.32 As the main threat to the SLOC was posed by Soviet submarines, anti-submarine 
warfare became the foremost priority of the RCN.  
As early as 1946, the Canada-US Permanent Joint Board of Defence’s Military 
Committee identified the Soviet Union as the main maritime threat which the two nations faced. 
The USSR had captured the designs and manufacturing facilities for the advanced Type XXI 
submarines which Nazi Germany had only begun to introduce at the end of the Second World 
War and were beginning to reproduce them in large quantities. The Type XXI was an advanced 
submarine which was capable of operating at much higher underwater speed than its 
predecessors and could only be countered by large, modern destroyers which Canada and its 
allies sorely lacked. In light of this new threat, the navy re-equipped the majority of its warships 
with the latest ASW weapons and sensors in 1948-49. Furthermore, it drew on its experience in 
the Second World War to embark on an ambitious program to design a large ASW-specialized 
destroyer which could operate effectively in the demanding North Atlantic environment. This 
was the genesis of the St. Laurent-class destroyers which began to enter service in 1955. 
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 drastically changed the outlook for the 
Canadian military, particularly the navy. Canada supported the US-led military response to the 
North Korean aggression and RCN destroyers served in the theatre until the cessation of 
hostilities in 1953. They made significant contributions in support of UN forces and operations, 
acting as screens for larger British and American warships as well as conducting naval fire 
support missions and interdiction operations which severely disrupted the North Koreans’ 
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railway and supply lines.33 However, the most important implications of the conflict were felt far 
away from the Korean Peninsula.  
The Korean War led many leading Western leaders and officials to conclude that war 
with the Soviet Union was inevitable and more importantly, while central Europe remained the 
most likely battleground, it could potentially break out anywhere. The majority of the RCN’s 
warships was concentrated on Canada’s east coast in preparations for operations in the North 
Atlantic which left its Pacific coast severely understrength and ill-equipped to deal with potential 
Soviet incursions. Concurrently, the Soviet Navy’s submarine service underwent a massive 
expansion from just a dozen ships in 1945 to some two-hundred fifty vessels by 1957.34 The few 
ships which the RCN possessed were far from sufficient to combat this threat and this 
development provided Vice Admiral Harold Grant, the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), with the 
justification he needed to press for more ships.35 Between 1955 and 1964, the RCN welcomed 
the addition of twenty new domestically designed and built destroyers.36  
The addition of the new destroyers greatly enhanced the ASW capabilities of the RCN as 
well as solidified Canada’s commitment to NATO. However, it also locked the RCN into the 
ASW and escort role which naval planners had originally sought to avoid.37 Canada lacked the 
requisite manpower or financial resources to defend the entirety of its territory and instead 
recognized it must rely on collective security arrangements, such as NATO, to ensure its safety 
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and security. A fleet primarily built around a large destroyer core with a strong ASW 
specialization was deemed to be the most effective contribution to the collective defence effort 
while simultaneously meeting Canada’s own national security needs.38 While the continued 
specialization in these roles made sense, there were growing concerns as to the RCN’s ability to 
react to future trends. 39 In 1955, when defence spending made up nearly 40 percent of total 
federal government expenditure, this was a minor concern as any capability gaps could be 
addressed by future ship classes.40 However, as defence spending fell due to a combination of an 
economic recession and the diversion of funds for other government priorities, these problems 
became increasingly difficult to address. Unfortunately for MARCOM, these fears were quickly 
realized as rapid technological advancements made Canada’s latest warships obsolete just as they 
entered service.  
In 1956, the RCN pitted HMCS St. Laurent, then considered to be the world’s most 
advanced ASW warship, in a training exercise against the USS Nautilus, the world’s first nuclear 
powered submarine, to test its ability to combat the emerging nuclear submarine (SSN) threat.41 
It proved to be ineffective against the SSN which could not only sustain a higher speed than its 
pursuers but also had the ability to remain submerged indefinitely. To further compound the 
problem, the sensors and weapons onboard the destroyers were too short ranged to detect and 
engage its opponent. This was only the tip of the proverbial iceberg for the RCN. In response, the 
navy experimented with a number of new innovative technologies to improve the operational 
capability of its ASW forces. The most notable innovation was the development of the 
“beartrap” helicopter landing system which enabled heavy ASW helicopters to be launched and 
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recovered on the small flight deck of a destroyer. As helicopters greatly enhanced the detection 
range of the destroyers, the CH-124 Sea Kings were acquired in 1961, with the St Laurent and 
Annapolis class destroyers converted to better accommodate these new assets as Destroyer 
Helicopter Escorts (DDH). 42 Another major technological advancement made by the RCN was 
the variable depth sonar. Unlike traditional hull-mounted sonars, the variable depth sonar was 
kept in a watertight unit which was then dropped into the ocean. The advantage of this new 
method was that it could detect submarine movements over a much larger area. However, as 
these new technologies were slowly being developed and retrofitted onto the destroyers, the 
limitations of the warships became increasingly apparent.  
 The shortcomings of Canada’s destroyers were highlighted by its experience during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 when the RCN’s Atlantic fleet was ostensibly sent out to 
sea for maneuvers as the crisis unfolded. However, its real purpose was to support the USN in 
the detection and surveillance of Soviet submarines along the eastern seaboard. The Canadian 
destroyers were able to expertly locate and track their Soviet adversaries. In fact, they were so 
successful that they were able to discover two American submarines who were also tailing their 
targets. However, it was also at this time that the RCN realized their warships had no means to 
destroy the Soviet submarines if it was necessary. The World War II-era weapon platforms 
aboard most of its ships had exceedingly limited range which forced the destroyers to move 
dangerously close to its targets before they could be utilized. Just two years later at SLAMEX 
2/64, the obsolescence of the Canadian warships became even more apparent. Advancements in 
propulsion technology had greatly increased the speed and range that submarines could operate 
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at. During the exercise, even the newly commissioned destroyers had trouble maintaining pace 
with the latest conventionally-powered submarine (SSK), let alone the nuclear-powered 
leviathans which had begun to patrol the North Atlantic.43 The RCN’s problems were however 
not confined to below the waves.  
The Second World War clearly demonstrated the superiority of aircraft over undefended 
warships and the development of anti-ship missiles only skewed the advantage further towards 
aerial weaponry. Although the RCN was well-equipped to locate and track sub-surface targets, it 
severely lacked the capability to defend itself against aerial threats. Air defence capabilities can 
be divided into two types: point defence and area air defence. The former refers to a limited air 
defence capability generally used to protect a single warship. In contrast, area air defence 
systems provide defence for a wider area, thus allowing it to protect multiple ships from an array 
of aerial threats. While Canadian destroyers maintained point defence capabilities, the RCN 
lacked an area air defence capability after HMCS Bonaventure retired its obsolescent Banshee 
fighters in 1962 without replacements. This meant Canadian warships were vulnerable to large 
scale aerial attacks from an increasing wide variety of enemy aircraft and anti-ship missiles and 
were dependent on support from allied navies. The ramifications of such a capability gap was 
that the navy was no longer free to conduct its own operations and must instead operate in either 
a theatre with a low aerial threat (i.e. North Atlantic) or as part of a coalition task force. 
The lack of air cover was the principal reason why Canadian warships were excluded 
from MC 70 in 1958, NATO’s naval war plans in the North Sea in a conflict with the Soviet 
Bloc. Instead, the RCN was tasked to operate in the relatively safe confines of the western 
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Atlantic and to defend the SLOC between North America and Europe from Soviet submarines 
which have managed to escape from the Baltic Sea.44 The defence of the SLOC was a 
strategically critical if underappreciated role for the RCN. Given that the bulk of NATO’s 
military strength and industrial capability resided in the USA, it would have to be escorted across 
the Atlantic for deployment in continental Europe. NATO’s military staff had predicted that 
Allied forces in Germany and France would not last more than three weeks in the face of the 
Soviet onslaught. 45 Therefore, it was imperative that reinforcements and supplies crossed the 
Atlantic quickly and safely. This was a task which the RCN was superbly equipped, for but its 
advantages were rapidly diminishing.  
These grim realizations forced Vice Admiral Harry DeWolf (CNS 1956-1960) to take 
drastic measures to create a more proficient ASW force. While this was the traditional strength 
of the navy, it was also a marked departure from the general-purpose fleet which naval planners 
had envisioned only a decade ago. The high cost to acquire the specialized equipment and 
training necessary to be a proficient ASW force also meant that the RCN would be locked into 
this role for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, when Vice Admiral DeWolf retired in 1960, the 
navy was in fair condition despite an aging fleet that needed to be replaced soon. While the 
situation was far from ideal, few could have foreseen the storm that was brewing on the horizon.  
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Chapter 1.2 – Integration of the Armed Forces and the Unification Crisis: The Navy’s 
darkest years, 1963-1968 
Just as the last warships from the 1950s shipbuilding program were beginning to enter 
service, the winds of politics shifted. In 1963, the Liberal Party under Lester B. Pearson returned 
to power on a platform centered around the expansion of social security programs. To fund the 
massive cost of the program, many government departments saw their funding slashed or frozen 
and were ordered to find additional savings where possible. As the single largest discretionary 
budgetary item, the defence budget was one of the logical sources for the required funds. 46 
Despite the reduction in funding, the Canadian military was tasked to carry out an increasing 
number of responsibilities and commitments. The combination of reduced funding allocations as 
well as rising operational and personnel costs inevitably meant that less money would be 
available for the purchase of capital equipment needed to sustain the operational capability of the 
military.47 It was with this backdrop that the newly appointed Minister of National Defence, Paul 
Hellyer, put forth plans to unify the Canadian military. 
Young and ambitious, Hellyer was determined to make his mark on the defence portfolio 
which he viewed as a stepping stone for greater opportunities. On March 26, 1964, a new White 
Paper on Defence was tabled to codify the Government’s new vision for the Canadian defence 
establishment. The centerpiece of the White Paper was the integration of the headquarter 
elements of the CA, RCN and RCAF which was the “…first step toward a single unified defence 
force for Canada.”48 Hellyer’s initial comments on the ultimate unification of the services into a 
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single new defence force were vague and military officials were led to believe that only the 
support and administrative services would be merged. The service branches would remain as 
operationally autonomous organizations which reported to a singular military chief, similar to the 
US Joint Chief of Staffs structure. Hellyer stated that the integration of headquarter staff would 
free up $100 million annually while ten thousand personnel could be redeployed for other use.49 
Furthermore, the government promised that the money saved through integration would be re-
invested in the military through the procurement of desperately needed new capital equipment.50 
The military chiefs had little choice but to reluctantly accept Hellyer’s plan.  
In addition to financial benefits, there was also a practical need to integrate and unify the 
command staffs of the elemental services. When Hellyer became the MND in April 1963, he was 
horrified to discover that not only had NATO and Canada-US continental defence commitments 
completely taken over the priorities of the Canadian military but each of the services had 
differing priorities, needs and beliefs of what constituted the greatest threat to Canada.51 As the 
RCAF, RCN and CA were entirely autonomous institutions, cooperation between the services 
was largely achieved through hundreds of interservice committees. While several high-level ones 
existed to coordinate overall Canadian strategic directions and policies, it was an ineffective 
system which left Canada without a clear, cohesive defence policy.52 The fractured structure of 
the military hierarchy also meant that backdoor dealings between the service chiefs were 
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commonplace, especially for procurement-related matters.53 It was normal practice for the 
generals and admirals to trade support for each other’s projects to ensure that their own needs 
would be met in the future. The absence of a central decision-making body alone was enough to 
justify the restructuring of the Canadian military establishment.  
Bill C-90, which effected the changes outlined above, was passed in the House of 
Commons on July 7th, 1964 and saw the three military chiefs replaced by a single Chief of 
Defence Staff (CDS) and the creation of the Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ). Prior to 
integration, the RCAF, the RCN and the Canadian Army each maintained their own 
administrative and training systems as well as functional units such as medical and supply 
formations. The triplication of these services was a costly luxury which the military could no 
longer afford given the austerity measures that were implemented. The decision to amalgamate 
the administrative services and supply systems of the military was largely welcomed by 
politicians, generals and the public alike. Had Hellyer chosen to end the re-organization of the 
military at this point, he would haven been remembered as one of the greatest MNDs in 
Canadian history.54 Instead, he chose to take this opportunity to not only re-establish civilian 
control over Canada’s defence policies but also to reset the culture of the armed forces. The 
subsequent phases of integration resulted in a protracted and public confrontation between the 
defence establishment and the minister. In the end, Hellyer got his way while the military was 
broken by the traumatic experience.  
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The next phase of integration involved the amalgamation of Canada’s military forces into 
six operational commands. 55 Questions soon emerged regarding the effects that the new 
arrangement would have on the operational capability of the military, especially those of the 
newly created Maritime Command (MARCOM). Unlike the army and air force which could 
more easily adjust to the new military structure and environment due to the interoperability of 
their skills and assets, naval assets and skills were unique to the service. The new military 
organization structure created by unification was a bureaucratic nightmare for military officials 
to navigate through. While the newly created Maritime Command retained operation control of 
Canada’s warships, its dockyards were under the jurisdiction of Material Command and the 
training system was ceded to Training Command.56 Furthermore, MARCOM did not have the 
ability to move personnel from ship to shore or vice versa as this fell under Personnel 
Command’s area of responsibility.57 As each of the commands were manned by personnel from 
all three former services, it was not uncommon for an army colonel to be in charge of a ship’s 
armament or vice versa. The new command structure, which was highly chaotic and inefficient, 
was a bitter pill for all military officials to swallow. By now, it had become apparent that 
Hellyer’s reorganization of the Canadian military extended well beyond administrative changes. 
Instead, his intentions were wholesale institutional changes which would have restructured the 
Canadian military into a fighting force similar to the US Marines. However, the most turbulent 
and destructive phase of unification had yet to come. 
The final phase of unification involved Bill C-243, the Canadian Forces Reorganization 
Act, which received royal assent on February 1, 1968, following months of fierce debate both 
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within Parliament and amongst the public. With the passing of the bill into law, the Royal 
Canadian Air Force, Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Navy ceased to exist as individual 
military services and were merged into a single entity known as the Canadian Armed Forces. 
While the idea to unify Canada’s three armed services had existed long before Hellyer’s 
announcement, it had never been given serious consideration because it was considered a 
political impossibility due to the strong ties that serving soldiers and veterans had to their 
respective service identity.58 One of Hellyer’s objective for unification was the elimination of a 
soldier’s loyalty to their branch of service and instead to identify with the Canadian Forces as a 
whole. He failed to understand the importance of identity and affiliation with a particular ship, 
squadron or regiment for servicemen; instead, he saw these emotional attachments as “old-
world.” Like the prime minister, Hellyer was a strong proponent of a distinct Canadian identity 
and saw it necessary to do away with the old customs of the British military, of which the RCN 
held dearest.  
The admirals of the RCN fought extensively and valiantly against integration and 
unification, particularly the elimination of service identity and paid heavily for their actions. The 
ensuing crisis, termed the “Revolt of the Admirals,” decimated the leadership of Canada’s 
maritime service for years to come.59 The first casualty was Vice Admiral Herbert Rayner, who 
opted to retire in July 1964 rather than continue to fight with Hellyer over integration.60 The next 
was Rear Admiral Jeffry Brock, the Flag Officer, Atlantic Coast and heir apparent to Rayner. 
Brock was dismissed on August 5, 1964 because Hellyer felt uncomfortable with his “Old-
World” values and believed he epitomized everything that was wrong with the RCN.61 Two 
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weeks later, Commodore Alexander Fraser-Harris, the leading proponent of the General-Purpose 
Frigates opted to retire eight years before he was required to.62 The unification process had 
barely begun, and three leading flag officers had already fallen. However, even more tumultuous 
times awaited the newly created MARCOM.  
The fight against unification was then carried on by Rear Admiral William Landymore, 
whose spirited and public opposition to it made him the face of the “Revolt of the Admirals”. 
Landymore’s opposition to unification stemmed from his experiences during the Second World 
War where he learned the importance and tradition and loyalty to the service as he watched the 
men under his command give up their lives in service to the RCN.63 Paul Hellyer’s unification 
plan threatened this sacred belief and Landymore was determined to fight tooth and nail to 
protect the heritage of an institution which thousands have laid down their lives for. Over the 
next two years, he attacked the policy when and where he could. The confrontation between 
Landymore and Hellyer reached its tipping point on July 12, 1966. 
On that fateful day, Hellyer asked Landymore to resign. When he refused, Landymore 
was sacked for “he has contravened service regulations by publicly opposing Government policy 
while in uniform.”64 His dismissal was preceded by the mass resignation of Vice Admiral 
Kenneth Dyer, Lieutenant General Robert Moncel, Air Chief Marshal Frank Miller, Lieutenant 
General Frank Fleury on July 4, 1966 in protest of the unilateral decisions Hellyer made with 
regards to unification. The final admiral of note, Rear Admiral Mickey Stirling, the Flag Officer, 
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Pacific Coast also tendered his resignation on the same day.65 With Landymore’s removal, the 
last vocal opposition to unification within the military was silenced. This did not signify the end 
of the struggle against the policy; however, none spoke out with the same vigour and resolve as 
the dismissed admiral. The number of senior officers who resigned or were dismissed over 
unification was staggering. Between 1964 to 1966, seventy-eight out of a hundred thirty-five 
general and flag officers left the military. The situation had gotten so out of control that Lester 
Pearson later confided to Landymore that “If one more admiral had resigned, I was going to tell 
Hellyer to stop unification.”66  
The decimation of the naval establishment during the Unification Crisis had significant 
repercussions for MARCOM, especially at the policy level. The loss of so many leading admirals 
and naval officers during the unification process meant that there was no strong naval presence 
within the newly created military hierarchy to present and defend the needs of MARCOM.67 As a 
result, the service once again fell to the bottom of Canada’s military priorities. While not an 
immediate concern, the majority of MARCOM’s vessels were built with an expected operational 
life of twenty years and in 1968, most of Canada’s destroyers were nearing this threshold. 
However, there remained no talks about their replacements due to the hostility of the new prime 
minister towards the CAF which was further compounded by the lack of naval representation at 
NDHQ. Given that it took an average of eight years from conception to when a warship entered 
service, MARCOM was left with a very small window to begin the procurement of a 
replacement for its aging destroyers.  
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The effects of unification were felt more immediately at the operational level. Beyond the 
loss of senior generals and admirals, thousands of officers and other ranks also left the service 
during this tumultuous period. It was later determined that between 1963 to 1966, 8 percent of all 
naval officers opted for early retirement, including 15 percent of Lieutenants (N) and Lieutenant 
Commanders which represented the future of the service.68 In the eighteen months after 
integration began in 1964, over twenty-six thousand soldiers and sailors left the Canadian 
military, representing over 20 percent of its total strength.69 Due to the mass exodus of personnel, 
MARCOM faced a shortage of manpower to man all its ships. It became common for a ship to 
be sent to sea with only 60 percent of its authorised strength or for personnel to spend months at 
sea at a time as they rotated between vessels. The tri-service nature of the new Canadian Forces 
also had a negative impact on operational capabilities. As Vice Admiral (ret’d) Nigel Brodeur 
recounted, there was an incident where a sailor on watch duty had gone overboard while at sea. 
His partner, who had recently transferred from the army was at a complete loss of what to do. 
Instead of ringing the overboard bell, he went to look for an NCO to report to. By then, it was far 
too late and the body of the sailor who had gone overboard was never recovered.70 The 
experience of the Unification Crisis and the subsequent exodus of servicemen not only destroyed 
the morale of MARCOM, but also the professionalism and operational capability of the 
service.71 As such, the navy spent much of the following years licking its wounds and rebuilding 
the capabilities it once possessed.  
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The legacy of integration and unification was dominated by the struggles for service 
identity, but the root causes of the event were economic and political considerations. As 
previously stated, the expansion of politically popular social welfare programs necessitated 
massive amounts of funding, a significant portion of which was drawn from the defence budget. 
Walter Gordon, the Minister of Finance, had pressed Hellyer to rationalize spending and to find 
savings where possible which became the raison d'etre for the latter to instigate integration and 
subsequently unification. The austerity measures introduced by the Pearson government in 1963 
were quickly felt by all three services but its impact on the RCN’s operational capabilities were 
the hardest given the service’s small size and technical requirements. 
The budget allocation for the RCN was traditionally by far the smallest of the three 
elemental services. Despite the increasingly expensive costs needed to operate a navy, its share 
of the defence budget averaged only 18 percent of annual defence expenditures for much of the 
1960s.72 In fiscal year (FY) 1960/61, the Department of National Defence was given a budget of 
$1.518 billion, of which only $333 million was allocated to the RCN. By FY 1970/71, the overall 
defence budget had been raised to $1.818 billion with $429 million devoted to MARCOM.73 
However, inflation had grown by an average of 2.68 percent annually during this ten-year period. 
As a result, the value of a dollar in 1970 was actually equal to 70 cent in 1960. When converted, 
the defence budget in 1970 was only valued at $1.272 billion in 1960 dollars. This meant that 
despite an increase of $300 million, the buying power of the CAF had actually decreased by 
$246 million. This equated to a decrease of $32.7 million in purchasing power of the navy during 
the decade. 74 Furthermore, spending on military capital equipment had actually fallen 
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significantly during the 1960s despite repeated assurance from the Government otherwise. In FY 
1962-63, capital spending amounted to 21.6 percent of the defence budget; by FY 1968-69, it 
had fallen to 16.7 percent.75  
The first casualty of the navy’s fiscal constraints was the money allocated for capital 
equipment as this was determined to have the least immediate effect on the daily operations of 
the navy. This was merely a band-aid solution for its fiscal problems as the RCN sacrificed the 
long-term health of the service to make ends meet now. During the 1950s, it was standard 
practice for the RCN to replace its vessels on a ship-for-ship basis, whereby a warship was only 
retired when its replacement was available. This ensured that the service’s capabilities would not 
be compromised due to a shortage of warships. However, the lack of funds meant that the RCN 
was no longer able to continue this practice and as a result, the navy lost twenty-five ships and 
welcomed only nine new ones during the 1960s. 
Citing cost overruns, the General-Purpose Frigate program was cancelled in October 
1963.76 By December, after exhausting all other possibilities of meeting the new budgetary 
restrictions, Vice Admiral Herbert Rayner reluctantly ordered Operation Cutback. Twenty-two 
World War II-era destroyers which were previously in reserve status were decommissioned, all 
of the naval air reserve squadrons were stood down, and the entire RCN reserves reduced to just 
two thousand and seven hundred personnel.77 Furthermore, the annual intake of Regular Officer 
Training Program candidates, which the majority of naval officers originated from was halved.78 
With the loss of so many critical assets and no replacements forthcoming, the RCN was 
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increasingly at risk of being too small to meet all of its NATO commitments. The loss of these 
assets was a huge blow not just to the operational capability of the RCN but also to its long-term 
sustainability. In just three short months, the future of Canada’s navy became far bleaker.  
Hellyer’s promise that the savings from unification would be reinvested into the military 
did little to reverse the decline of the military’s operational capability, particularly those of 
MARCOM. Despite the recommendations of the Brock Report (1961) which advocated a return 
to a balanced-fleet configuration, the strategic reality was that Canada’s aging maritime forces 
was increasingly at risk of being unable to fulfill its core functions of anti-submarine warfare. It 
was recognized that MARCOM must invest all its resources to the continued development and 
modernization of its ASW capabilities which Hellyer agreed to. Studies conducted by 
MARCOM and allied navies concluded that while destroyers were effective ASW vessels, the 
best submarine hunter-killer was another submarine.79 The RCN traditionally did not maintain a 
permanent submarine capability and instead loaned them from the Royal Navy or USN for 
training purposes. In 1960, there was a strong push by naval officials to acquire the USN’s 
Barbel-class submarines. However, due to the high cost of these vessels, the Canadian 
government chose to acquire the cheaper Oberon-class submarines instead. The results were the 
acquisition of three Oberon-class submarines, four DDH-280 destroyers and two auxiliary oil 
replenishment (AOR) ships. Nevertheless, MARCOM’s operational capabilities continued to 
decline.  
Faced with both a severe manpower shortage and a dwindling operational budget, 
MARCOM decided in 1969 that the aircraft carrier HMCS Bonaventure would be 
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decommissioned. This decision, which came less than two years after it had completed its 
controversial life extension refit, was largely due to financial reasons as the operating cost of the 
carrier and its air wing alone made up nearly a quarter of the navy’s operational budget. 80 
Although the loss of the carrier was a significant blow, it had become a luxury that the navy 
could no longer afford and was ultimately deemed acceptable as it allowed for five to six 
destroyers to be retained. 
The events of the preceding years had left the CAF, particularly MARCOM battered, 
bruised and ill-prepared to face the challenges ahead. Compared to the start of the decade, 
MARCOM was in a dire situation as it found itself with considerably less ships, personnel and 
talent as well as aging destroyers that were technologically insufficient to face the threats of the 
new age. Though the impending arrival of DDH-280 destroyers represented a glimmer of hope 
for the future, the initial Trudeau years would offer no reprieve for the beleaguered military. 
Instead his eagerness to “shake things up” forced the CAF and MARCOM to once again dig in to 
fight for their survival.  
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Chapter 2 – Political Idealism vs Strategic Realism: Canada’s 
Foreign and Defence Policies under Pierre Trudeau, 1968 – 1977 
“For Canada, NATO membership had an important symbolic meaning, but being a key player – really 
making a difference militarily, was too costly for too little return.” – David Bercuson81  
Just weeks after the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act came into effect, Pierre Elliot 
Trudeau succeeded Lester B. Pearson as the prime minister of Canada. He was one of the most 
brilliant, if divisive, individuals to hold the office. Amongst his many achievements, the 
repatriation of the constitution from Great Britain and the establishment of Canada as a bilingual 
nation stood out as events which defined his legacy. However, his record on defence and foreign 
affairs matters were marred by numerous controversies and widely derided as one of the darkest 
periods in Canadian military history.82 It was clear from the onset that the worldviews of the new 
prime minister differed significantly from those of his predecessor. Soon after assuming office, 
Trudeau declared that everything was open to review; the longstanding foreign affairs and 
defence policies were no exception.  
There were three distinct phases to Trudeau’s foreign and defence policy during his 
tenure as prime minister.83 The first, which took place from when he took office in 1968 to 1973, 
saw Trudeau attempt to re-invent Canada’s defence and foreign policies. It was evident that the 
prime minister was not a strong supporter of the CAF or its existing priorities. He was also 
critical of Canada’s participation in NATO and saw the alliance as an outdated relic from a past 
era. His attempt to implement a new direction for Canada and its armed forces was met with 
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significant opposition from the country’s allies. Trudeau was initially unmoved by their concerns 
but his views of both NATO and the CAF would mature with time.  
In the second phase, which lasted from 1973 to 1977, Trudeau reversed his course and 
invested billions in the CAF as he sought to reassure allies of the country’s commitment to 
NATO. 84 This reversal came as the prime minister was forced to confront both the political 
ramifications of his early actions as well as the limitations of Canada’s capacity for unilateral 
actions. More importantly, he gained a new sense of appreciation for the armed forces and the 
importance of a credible military to the advancement of other national policies and objectives. 
The last phase, which took place from 1978, onward was a return to a more apathetic attitude 
towards defence.85 Nevertheless, during this brief window, the CAF began a complete re-
armament program with the procurement of badly needed equipment such as the C1 Leopard 
Tanks, McDonnell-Douglas CF-188 Hornet fighters and the first phase of the Canadian Patrol 
Frigates program.  
Chapter 2.1 – The Views of Pierre Elliot Trudeau 
Prior to succeeding Lester B. Pearson as prime minister in 1968, Pierre Trudeau was a 
relative unknown in the scenes of Ottawa. He was first elected in 1965 and had only briefly 
served as cabinet minister for a year prior to his ascension to the top of the political hierarchy. 
His meteoric rise was a result of not only his charismatic personality and intelligence but also the 
reflection of a younger generation of Canadians who sought to bring tangible change to the 
world. For many, especially within the junior ranks of the Liberal Party and the bureaucracy, 
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Trudeau represented a fresh voice and offered a vision that contrasted the existing policies which 
were increasingly perceived as stagnant and obsolete.86  
For many first-time prime ministers, the political realms of foreign affairs and defence 
are often the most difficult to understand and master. This could largely be attributed to a 
combination of their lack of experience, the complexity of interstate relations and the hard fact 
that Canada has little influence over global events beyond what it could leverage in skilful 
diplomacy with more powerful nations through international organizations. Though domestic 
affairs are the primary concern of the government, foreign relations can have a large impact on 
the internal affairs of a country like Canada whose economy relies heavily on international trade 
and immigration. This was an aspect which Pierre Trudeau initially struggled to comprehend as 
he, unlike Pearson who was a career diplomat, had little appreciation for the intricacies of 
international relations when he took office. His inexperience and trademark enlightened idealism 
quickly led to clashes with NATO allies, particularly over the level of effort that Canada would 
put into collective defence.  
The overriding objective of Canada’s defence policy had long been to deter a conflict 
between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This did not change with the transition of leadership 
from Pearson to Trudeau but the two men differed on the means to achieve this end. Pearson 
recognized that as a middle power, Canada had very little influence in the formulation of great-
power strategic policies or in the shaping of global events. Instead, he was a pragmatic 
internationalist who made significant use of Canada’s soft power to maintain the strategic 
balance with the Warsaw Pact and prevent the escalation of local conflicts into a global 
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flashpoints through international peacekeeping operations. However, in the pursuit of these 
strategic objectives, Canada’s own interests were often sacrificed for the proverbial greater 
good.87 The best-known example of this was the Suez Crisis, when Canada broke ranks from its 
traditional allies, Britain and France, to establish an UN-mandated peacekeeping operation to de-
escalate the crisis. While Pearson’s actions garnered Canada considerable prestige and 
international recognition, there were few tangible rewards for the country’s efforts.  
Trudeau did not dispute Pearson’s concept of Canada as a “middle power” but, his 
approach as to what constituted an “effective power” differed drastically.88 He saw the policies 
adopted by Pearson, particularly the overriding priority given to establishment of good relations 
with the USA and NATO as archaic.89 While Trudeau agreed that NATO was needed in the 
wake of the Second World War, it had now outlived its purpose. Moreover, he believed that the 
European countries themselves, rather than Canada, should be responsible for the defence of 
their own territory as the continent recovered from the conflict. 90 Unlike Pearson, Trudeau 
believed that Canada’s own interests should determine its foreign and defence policies.91 He 
believed that for Canada to be taken seriously on the global stage, it must foster international 
credibility by setting and pursuing its own goals even if that should on occasion irritate its 
allies.92 Trudeau came from an academic setting and as such, was open to the widest range of 
alternatives before a decision was reached. This included contentious unilateral decisions such as 
disassociation from NATO if it could contribute to international peace and stability.  
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Trudeau was not alone in his doubts about the continued utility of NATO. Several cabinet 
ministers under Pearson had privately made known their skepticism about the alliance. However, 
cabinet discussions on Canada’s role in the world were always dominated by long time stalwarts 
of the international order such as Lester Pearson and his foreign minister, Paul Martin Sr.93 With 
the retirement of Pearson and Martin Sr. relegated to the Senate, Trudeau and his revisionist 
supporters were finally free to alter Canada’s policies as they saw fit. Spurred by the strong anti-
war and anti-American sentiments stemming from the Vietnam War, there was widespread 
support against the continuation of the status quo. Once in office, Trudeau immediately began to 
chart a new course for Canada’s defence and foreign policies. However, Trudeau would soon 
learn that change would not come as easily as he believed even if he cared little for the opinions 
of Canada’s allies or the potential consequences during these early years. 
Pierre Trudeau’s desire to carve a new foreign and defence policy largely stemmed from 
his belief that the interests of the alliance had, in many respects eclipsed Canada’s own 
interests.94 As Paul Hellyer discovered in 1963, alliance priorities had come to effectively dictate 
Canada’s defence policies and little had changed since. The bulk of the military was either 
permanently stationed or earmarked for deployment to Europe in times of hostilities while the 
defence of Canada and its sovereign territory remained an afterthought. The immediate defence 
of Canada and its sovereignty had been subsumed by the country’s other alliance commitments 
in Europe as well as the obligation to assist the US in continental defence, which increasingly 
meant protection of the American nuclear arsenal. This also meant that NATO and the 
continental defence commitment with the USA continued to dictate the strategic direction and 
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equipment needs of the CAF. To the bureaucratic and political establishment, this arrangement 
while far from ideal, was accepted as the price to pay for collective defence. That, however, was 
not acceptable to the newly elected prime minister who firmly believed that Canadian political 
leadership should have the final say on the size, equipment, and mission of the military.95  
The degree of control which NATO and the USA had over the development of Canada’s 
own policies greatly disturbed Trudeau. In a speech to the Alberta Liberal Association on April 
12, 1969, he declared that “Canada has no foreign policy except that flowing from NATO… and 
it is simply wrong to have a military alliance determine foreign policy… it should be your 
foreign policy which determines your military policy.”96 Furthermore, he was determined that 
these policies should not be dictated by the assumption that war with the Warsaw Pact was 
inevitable, as the only conclusion to such a conflict would be mutual destruction.97 Instead, 
Trudeau and his allies believed that Canada’s role in the world was to prevent the escalation of 
hostilities from reaching such a scenario. However, the strong American and NATO influences 
on the design of Canadian policies severely limited its influence as a middle power and made it 
nearly impossible for the country to advance its own interests outside of the alliance setting.  
Trudeau also had little faith in the ability of military men to keep peace; in fact, he had a 
very low opinion of them, commenting that the Canadian military was a “waste of money and a 
haven for simple-minded and possibly dangerous conservatives.”98 In his opinion, the Canadian 
Armed Forces served little purpose other than as an expensive bargaining chip to be used in 
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negotiations with the provinces or the country’s allies.99 Furthermore, Trudeau believed, as did 
many others, that war with the Warsaw Pact would quickly escalate into an apocalyptic nuclear 
war. As such, it made little sense to him to invest heavily in the military if it would be quickly 
wiped out at the onset of hostilities. On top of that, the garrison in West Germany, while costly 
to maintain and equip, was considered to be militarily insignificant as Canadian assets made only 
4 percent of NATO’s tactical air fleet and 1.5 percent of the total ground force.100 The value of 
the contingent was largely symbolic in nature, representing a physical manifestation of Canada’s 
commitment to the alliance.  
From a pragmatic point of view, Canada’s participation in NATO brought the nation few 
benefits. Despite repeated claims by officials from the Department of External Affairs (DEA) 
and DND that Canada’s continued presence in Europe brought it influence within the alliance, 
they struggled to provide tangible examples when pressed by Trudeau. Unlike the Americans and 
British, whose garrisons were subsidized by the West German government, Canada had to 
shoulder this cost entirely. The cost to maintain the garrison in 1969 was $120 million CAD, 
which represented approximately seven percent of the entire defence budget.101 The Canadian 
government had further contributed an additional $175 million over the years to the construction 
and maintenance of NATO common infrastructure.102 Despite the hefty investment into NATO, 
defence purchases from Canada by its allies totalled only $1 million.103 Furthermore, while 
Canada would refund the custom duties and sales tax of defence products imported from Europe 
by Canadian companies, this practice was not reciprocated by its European allies.104 Canadian 
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exports to Europe dropped from 25 percent to just 16 percent of the nation’s total exports due to 
tariffs and other protectionist policies implemented by the EEC during the 1960s.105 On the 
strategic level, Canada’s opinions mattered little in the development of NATO policies which 
were largely dictated by the USA. Instead, Canada was viewed by its allies as a “good partner” 
that quietly carried out its responsibilities without complaint. It was evident to Trudeau that 
Canada’s participation in NATO was not particularly beneficial and perhaps a new direction 
would yield better results.  
Chapter 2.2 – A New Direction, 1968 – 1973 
The NATO Alliance had long been in the crosshairs for Trudeau because it epitomized 
the Pearsonian policies and international order which Trudeau saw as old and archaic. In 1968, 
Canada’s major contributions to NATO were the permanent deployment of a ten thousand men 
garrison to West Germany divided between three fighter squadrons and a mechanised combined-
arms brigade while Canadian warships were assigned to STANAVFORLANT on rotational 
assignments.106 While a sizable force, there was little expectation that the garrison would be able 
to hold off the hordes of mechanised Soviet divisions should hostilities occur. Instead, their 
presence was largely a symbolic gesture of Canada’s commitment to NATO and to the defence 
of western Europe. However, for Trudeau, the garrison at best represented Canada’s commitment 
to the alliance and at worst, a hostage to ensure continued compliance.107 Once in power, 
Trudeau ordered a comprehensive review of Canada’s defence and foreign policy with an 
emphasis on the European garrison and NATO.  
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Soon after he became prime minister, Pierre Trudeau announced his intentions to 
withdraw the Canadian garrison in West Germany. However, this plan was poorly received 
within his cabinet. Both Leo Cadieux, the Minister of National Defence, and Mitchell Sharp, the 
Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), threatened to resign over the issue. This forced 
Trudeau to defer the proposal until the review of Canada’s defence and foreign policy was 
completed. In September 1969, a compromise was reached and the government announced that 
the garrison in Europe would be reduced from ten thousand to five thousand personnel by the 
end of 1970. The reductions were not well received by Canada’s European allies who were 
constantly wary of any indications that their North American counterparts would abandon them 
to their fate; Trudeau’s actions and comments would only serve to validate their fears. The 
Americans were similarly displeased by Canada’s sudden announcements and sought to 
convince the prime minister to reverse his course but to no avail. 108  
This episode illustrated Trudeau’s lack of understanding of international affairs at this 
stage of his tenure as prime minister. While Canada continued to publicly proclaim its support 
and solidarity with NATO, its actions did not match its words. The decision to reduce its forces 
in Europe suggested to the broader global community that there was a growing rift within 
NATO. This had the potential to greatly escalate the strategic situation, especially if the Soviet 
Union had perceived it as a sign that the USA would not come to the support of Europe if 
hostilities began. His subsequent unilateral decisions to reach out to Communist nations such as 
the People’s Republic of China (1970), the Soviet Union (1971) and Cuba (1976) further drew 
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the ire of its allies as Canada became a maverick within NATO. However, these opinions did 
little to deter Trudeau. 
Despite the many public statements about a new era of Canadian defence and foreign 
policy by the prime minister, there was initially an expectation amongst senior parliamentarians 
and bureaucrats that the status quo would be maintained with only minor modifications to 
appease Trudeau. Even Trudeau himself privately confessed that he initially did not expect a 
wholesale change in policy if the existing ones were well-reasoned and helped to achieve 
Canada’s strategic goals. 109 A review of the nation’s foreign policy led by Norman Paterson 
concluded any conflict with the Warsaw Pact would likely be the result of strategic 
miscalculations as opposed to deliberate aggression and that the current position was in Canada’s 
best interest. DND officials reached a similar conclusion in their review of Canadian defence 
policy. However, Trudeau rejected their advice because it essentially was a continuation of the 
status quo rather than the wide-ranging examination of policies that he wanted.110 Unsatisfied 
with the advice given to him by the bureaucrats at DND and DEA, he turned to his confidant and 
foreign policy advisor, Ivan Head, to explore a new defence policy.  
Head’s report, titled Canadian Defence Policy: A Review was arguably the most 
important document in the formulation of Pierre Trudeau’s foreign and defence policy during 
this period. While Mitchell Sharp was the face of Canada’s foreign relations as the SSEA, it was 
Head who effectively directed Canadian policies as the prime minister’s personal foreign policy 
advisor.111 Furthermore, many of the positions advocated in this paper would be adopted by the 
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1971 White Paper on Defence. The central argument of Head’s review was that Canada’s role in 
the world was not to be a fighter; rather, it should be a driver of world peace through the de-
escalation of conflicts worldwide, funding peace initiatives and through peacekeeping 
operations.112  
Although this was not an entirely new outlook on Canada’s role in the world, it was the 
means by which this objective would be achieved that would prove to be highly controversial. 
Head contended that the CAF’s force structure and active participation in NATO actually 
worked to destabilise the international strategic situation as opposed to de-escalating tensions.113 
Specifically, he targeted three components of the military contribution to NATO: (1) The CF-104 
fighters in Germany which were armed with nuclear weapons and were perceived as a first-strike 
asset; (2) the tanks of 4 CMBG which were seen as an offensive asset that had no role to play in 
Canada or peacekeeping operations and should instead be withdrawn from service; (3) the goal 
of MARCOM’s strategic ASW duties was to locate, harass and destroy Soviet nuclear ballistic 
submarines (SSBN) which formed the bulk of the USSR’s second-strike capability.114 Head 
reasoned that if the Soviet SSBNs were no longer able to maintain a credible second-strike 
capability due to effective ASW from MARCOM, it would tilt the strategic balance and 
undermine the nuclear deterrence which allowed peace to occur.115 Furthermore, as weapons of 
war, these assets had no place in the constabulary operations within Canada which Trudeau and 
Head envisioned as the future of the military. 
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Ivan Head proposed a drastic restructure of the CAF. The proposed reorganization of the 
forces in West Germany would see the garrison further reduced to a mere light infantry battalion 
and a squadron of fighters.116 Most notably, heavy weapon platforms such as tanks and artillery 
pieces would be removed from service as they were not compatible with domestic operational 
requirements. Despite strong protests from both the CDS and the US Supreme Commander 
Allied - Europe (SACEUR), Head believed that the size and capabilities of the Canadian garrison 
in Germany mattered little to its allies; what truly mattered was the mere presence of Canadian 
soldiers for solidarity purposes.117  
Head’s arguments aligned strongly with those of Dr. Robert Sutherland, the director of 
the Defence Research Board, which was the research branch of the CAF. Sutherland was also a 
strong proponent of the belief that Canada’s role in the world was to deter war and not to fight it. 
He recognised that Canada’s contributions to NATO were militarily negligible in a conflict with 
the Warsaw Pact and their presence was instead to demonstrate Canada’s continued political 
commitment to the alliance. He, too, argued that token contributions to NATO were more than 
sufficient.118 These arguments strongly resonated with Pierre Trudeau, who personally opined 
that there was no need to maintain a military force in Europe if it would be wiped out at the start 
of hostilities by nuclear weapons.119 This mistaken belief that token contributions were sufficient 
to please the allies would become the hallmark of Pierre Trudeau’s defence policies during his 
early years. 
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This principle would be applied closer to home as well, in the continental defence 
partnership with the United States. Head recognized that the real key to peace was the strategic 
nuclear deterrence between the USA and USSR. While he was a strong supporter of the need to 
protect the USA’s second-strike capability as a means to maintain the nuclear deterrence and 
credibility, Head did not believe it was Canada’s responsibility to militarily support the 
Americans.120 Once again, he believed that minimal contributions, this time in the form of 
airfields, advance warning radar sites and other non-military assets would be sufficient.121 
Similarly, the strategic ASW role of MARCOM in the North Atlantic should be curbed in favour 
of other domestic maritime roles. In essence, Head’s proposal was to contribute minimally to 
NATO and North American defence because he saw these alliances as counterproductive to the 
maintenance of mutual nuclear deterrence between the two superpowers.  
In the wake of Head’s review of Canadian defence and foreign policies, two major events 
confirmed to Trudeau that his strategic re-orientation to sovereignty protection was correct. The 
first was the passage of the US tanker, SS Manhattan, through the Northwest Passage in the 
summer of 1969 without prior notice to or approval from Canadian authorities. This blatant 
violation of Canadian sovereignty by an American merchant vessel demonstrated that as the 
Arctic sea ice melted, Canada was increasingly vulnerable to incursions in its sovereign waters. 
The second event was the October Crisis in 1970 when the FLQ, a Quebec-based terrorist 
organization kidnapped James Cross, the British High Trade Commissioner to Canada and 
murdered Pierre Laporte, the provincial Minister of Labour. In response, Trudeau imposed the 
War Measures Act, the only time done during peacetime in Canadian history, which saw 
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Canadian soldiers deployed onto the streets of Quebec to maintain law and order. While the FLQ 
ceased to be a major domestic terrorism threat in the aftermath of the October Crisis, the 
underlying Quebec nationalism remained a problem which Trudeau would spend the rest of his 
tenure as prime minister trying to address.  
The Trudeau government detailed the shift in Canada’s defence policies with the release 
of the 1971 White Paper on Defence, aptly titled Defence in the 70s. This document was largely 
based on the positions advocated by Head in his review. The overarching goal of Canadian 
defence policy was the prevention of nuclear war through a combination of détente, arms control 
and disarmament, and contributions to a stable mutual deterrence.122 To achieve this objective, 
the Canadian Armed Forces were assigned four core responsibilities, in order of priority: 123 
1. The protection of Canadian sovereignty 
2. Defence of North America in cooperation with the USA 
3. Fulfillment of NATO obligations 
4. International peacekeeping 
The Trudeau government also charged the CAF to be a positive social driver in Canada which 
entailed being a unifying force for Canadians, stimulating economic growth and promoting 
technological innovations. Most notably, Defence in the 70s stressed the importance of Canadian 
content in future procurement programs.124  
The strategic objective and the associated responsibilities of the armed forces were 
largely unchanged from the 1964 White Paper on Defence with the major difference being the 
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prioritization of the protection of Canadian sovereignty over the fulfillment of its NATO 
obligations. While Defence in the 70s affirmed Canada’s commitment to the NATO alliance, it 
was clear that its actions did not match its words. The document formalized the reduction of the 
Canadian garrison in West Germany from ten thousand to five thousand soldiers. Furthermore, 
Canadian heavy tanks and artillery systems would also be phased out in favour of a light vehicle 
while the air division was reduced and reorganized from a nuclear strike force to one which 
provided conventional air support.125 From a maritime perspective, MARCOM would no longer 
be a dedicated ASW force and instead would be converted into a general-purpose fleet with a 
focus on sovereignty patrol.126 It would however, continue to make its ships available to 
STANAVFORLANT and NATO naval exercises as necessary.  
The change in Canada’s strategic orientation was not well-received by its allies, but the 
government justified its new positions based on the belief that as Europe recovered from the 
Second World War, it should increasingly shoulder more of the burden of defence.127 In a speech 
to the General Officers Symposium by Leo Cadieux on May 7, 1970, he stated that the 
government did not foresee a direct military threat to Canada. Instead, the main threat would 
result from conflicts in which the neighbouring USA might become embroiled. However, the 
government argued that “threats of this kind cannot be met by Canadian National Military Power 
alone; nor are they likely to be directly influenced by the details of the structure or posture of the 
Canadian Forces.”128 As a sovereign nation, Canada had the right to deploy, reconfigure and re-
orient the military as the government saw fit. Regardless, as a member of a larger defence 
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collective, the lack of consultation or consideration for the opinions of its allies remained 
alarming. 
Chapter 2.3 – A Return to Normalcy, 1973 – 1975 
The reversal of Trudeau’s defence and foreign policies was not the result of a single 
event or sudden realization; instead, it was a gradual process born out of economical and political 
needs and circumstances. Since the end of the Second World War, Canada and the USA shared 
increasingly close relations, particularly in trade and the defence of the North American 
continent. Exports to the USA made up approximately 15 percent of Canada’s entire GDP while 
Canadian and US military forces were operationally integrated through military agreements such 
as NATO and NORAD.129 However, just like any normal relationship, there were both high and 
low points with Trudeau’s first years in office undoubtedly representing one of the darkest 
moments. Differences of opinions on many matter between the prime minister and his US 
counterpart, Richard Nixon, were largely to blame. Trudeau’s open opposition to the Vietnam 
War as well as Canada’s unilateral decision to normalize relations with Communist nations had 
greatly displeased the Nixon administration. The catalyst for this chain of events was the passage 
of the New Economic Policy in 1971. 
The United States’ refusal to exempt Canada from increased duties under this new policy 
drove Trudeau to end Canada’s overreliance on the Americans and instead seek to diversify its 
trade partners and relations; a shift that would become known as the Third Option. The natural 
alternative was to pursue closer trade relations with its European allies, specifically the EEC. 
Canada’s attempts to engage the community for stronger trade relations began in earnest in 1973. 
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However, these preliminary efforts were met with cold shoulders and negotiations proved to be 
difficult. Prior to Pierre Trudeau’s visit to its member nations in 1975, Marcel Cadieux, the 
ambassador to the EEC reported that the general sentiment from European diplomats was that 
“Canada should not expect favours from Europe if it is not prepared to shoulder the defence 
burden.”130 While Trudeau brushed off the comment as remarks from a few grumpy ambassadors 
and did not reflect the political reality, it was clear that Canada’s allies had yet to forgive the 
decision to reduce the European garrison.131  
As Frank Maas argued in The Price for Alliance, the turning point in Trudeau’s 
understanding of the importance of a strong armed forces came after the meeting with the West 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in March 1975 at Bonn.132 West Germany was one of the 
most influential members of the EEC and its support was crucial if Canada were to secure the 
trade agreement that it desired. At this crucial meeting, Schmidt stressed to Trudeau the psycho-
political importance of visible and tangible military contributions to NATO for West Germany. 
Schmidt stated that “A German farmer is not able to detect the identity of NATO aircraft flying 
overhead as their contrails stream behind them. Besides, he knows that those planes can flee 
westward as quickly as they can fly eastward. He recognizes the maple leaf on tanks and infantry 
vehicles, however, and knows that there is no escape for them in the event of war. These units 
are reassuring and important, whether or not there is a persuasive military role for them.”133 
Although the abovementioned quote dealt specifically with the need for the CAF to maintain 
tanks in Europe, it was an intellectual argument which strongly resonated with Trudeau and 
convinced him of the importance of a strong and credible military to the advancement of 
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Canadian foreign policy objectives. Although Maas attributed this meeting as the breakthrough 
moment in the reversal of Trudeau’s defence policies, officials within DND had long sensed that 
change might be forthcoming.  
The initial Pierre Trudeau years were a continuation of the decade of darkness as his 
hostility towards the CAF and NATO, as well as his stubbornness in implementing a new 
defence policy resulted in a significant decline in Canada’s standing amongst its allies. Yet, the 
accusation that Trudeau “had not the slightest interest in or appreciation of the Canadian Forces” 
by renowned historian Jack Granatstein was exaggerated.134 Trudeau did come to appreciate the 
importance of the CAF, even if only because it contributed to the advancement of other Canadian 
policies and objectives. Nevertheless, it was under his watch that the CAF would undergo its 
largest re-armament program since the expansion of the regular forces in the 1950s to early 
1960s. The acquisition of major weapon platforms such as the C1 Leopard Tank and CF-188 
Hornet fighter greatly enhanced the capabilities of the Canadian military. The final major 
procurement program undertaken by the government was the CPF program. As MARCOM 
officials set out to begin the procurement for the next generation of Canadian warships, they 
found themselves in a dangerous new world.  
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Chapter 3- The Strategic Trends of a Dangerous New World 
“Those who have the capacity to use the sea routes in safety will survive. Those who have the capacity to 
interrupt this international intercourse will remain, as always in the past, in a position to achieve their 
means.” – Rear Admiral (ret’d) Robert Timbrell, RCN135 
In the three decades after the end of the Second World War, Canada’s geopolitical and 
strategic reality was a paradox and one over which the nation had very little control. As a nation 
with limited military capabilities, it had neither the capacity to fight a war on its own or the 
influence in global affairs to prevent one. Therefore, it had to participate in a larger alliance such 
as NATO for collective defence against foreign threats and to amplify global influence. Yet, it 
was because of its participation in NATO that Canada would become involved in any conflict 
between the Western powers and the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, owing to the geographical 
closeness to the USA, Canada would never be the target of a direct attack; however, it would 
undoubtedly be caught in the crossfire on any conflicts between the two global hegemonies.136 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the attempts by Pierre Trudeau to remove Canada from 
this conundrum proved to be futile. Instead, the Government chose to renew Canada’s 
commitment as a contributing member of the NATO alliance.  
The Canadian army garrison and air task force in West Germany, which was in the 
process of being re-equipped with the C1 Leopard Tanks and CF-188 Hornet fighter, may have 
been the most visible sign of the country’s commitment to the NATO alliance. However, its most 
valuable contributions were at sea. While NATO predicted the most likely battlefront with the 
Warsaw Pact to be central Europe, the bulk of the Alliance’s military and industrial capability 
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resided across the Atlantic Ocean in North America. In times of hostilities, the massive amount 
of reinforcements and supplies necessary to mount the defence of Western Europe would have to 
be transported across by merchant shipping.137 The protection of these vessels from destruction 
by Soviet submarines was one of the main responsibilities of SACLANT.138 Canada’s 
specialization in ASW made MARCOM a highly valuable asset for NATO. 
Still, MARCOM’s operational capabilities had declined significantly since the mid 
1960s, as discussed in Chapter One. With the advent of nuclear propulsion and weaponry, the 
practicality and viability of the ASW role faced increased scrutiny as did the need for Canada to 
maintain such an expensive specialization whose costs were escalating exponentially. As 
successive governments debated the future of Canada’s maritime forces, the strategic landscape 
continued to evolve at a rapid pace. When the Trudeau government once again embraced the 
NATO alliance in 1974/75, Canada’s maritime forces were ill-equipped to counter the new 
threats. More importantly, the perpetual funding issue of the CAF that the Trudeau government 
thought it had previously addressed once again resurfaced and forced the prime minister, who 
had no other alternatives, to order a Defence Structure Review.  
Chapter 3.1 – Soviet Naval Expansion and Policy 
The foremost threat to NATO from a maritime perspective was posed by the unprecedent 
growth of the Soviet Navy. For much of Soviet history, the navy was an afterthought. 139 It had 
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played relatively minor roles in both the Soviet Revolution as well as the Second World War, the 
two conflicts which defined the development of the Soviet armed forces. The isolationist nature 
of the regime also meant that the navy played little part in Soviet foreign policy. However, this 
would change drastically in the 1950s as the Soviet leadership recognized the value of a 
powerful naval force both for defence and the advancement of its international interests.140 As a 
result, the Soviet Navy underwent a long period of sustained growth from the 1960s which 
transformed it from a coastal defence force to a blue water navy capable of projecting Soviet 
might around the globe. At the height of its expansion during the 1960s and early 1970s, the 
Soviet Navy introduced a new class of warship or major weapon systems at an average rate of 
once every seven years.141 Such growth was unheard of in the West and allowed the Soviets to 
rapidly close the capability gap with the USN and other NATO navies. Although the expansion 
of Soviet maritime forces was not a problem for Canada alone to contend with, it had significant 
implications on the force structure and priorities of MARCOM. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Soviet maritime policy had two 
major focuses: the development of a coastal defence force in conjunction with land-based assets 
to deter a seaborne invasion and the establishment of a large submarine fleet to disrupt NATO 
maritime activities in the Atlantic.142 The latter was effectively a continuation of the unrestricted 
submarine warfare mounted by Germany during the two world wars. As the bulk of NATO’s 
military and industrial capability was based in North America, the severance of the SLOC 
between the two continents would cripple the fighting capability of the NATO forces in Western 
Europe. By 1957, the Soviet Navy had grown into a significant fleet with approximately three 
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hundred submarines.143 This force posed a significant threat to both the USN carrier strike 
groups, which were at the core of NATO’s deterrence strategy and also to the alliance’s ability to 
maintain the SLOC during times of hostilities. In response, NATO members, particularly 
Canada, invested heavily in the development of ASW forces. 
  The massive expansion of the Soviet Navy was also driven by the geography of the 
country.144 The vastness of the USSR meant that naval bases are located far from each other and 
are virtually unsupportable by sea during times of hostilities. Of the four main Soviet fleets, only 
the Northern Fleet could expect unrestricted access to its bases at all times; the Baltic Fleet 
(Danish Strait), Black Sea Fleet (the Dardanelles) and Pacific Fleet (Strait of Japan) were all 
exposed to interdiction by enemy forces if war were to break out.145 The Soviet military 
leadership were keenly aware of this problem as well as the fact that losses would not be easily 
replaceable. The large reserve of ships ensured that the fleets would remain combat effective 
even if they suffered significant losses. The Soviet Navy was largely manned by conscripts 
which created a very substantial ongoing training requirement as each class of new conscripts 
entered service and replaced their trained predecessors. This commitment, coupled with the 
frequent refits of the warships meant only a small portion of the Soviet Navy was combat 
effective at any time.146 Nevertheless, the Soviet Navy had a formidable potential for the 
mobilization of large forces in wartime. 
The expansion of Soviet maritime forces was not limited to the naval service. The 
USSR’s merchant and fishing fleets also grew exponentially and by 1980, were the sixth and 
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fifth largest such fleets in the world respectively.147 The expansion of both the military and 
commercial fleet allowed both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev to make significant use 
of Soviet maritime assets to expand Soviet influence globally.148 While not military in nature, 
these maritime activities still posed a significant threat to Canadian and NATO interests. Soviet 
merchant shipping was used to deliver arms to groups which aligned with the USSR in proxy 
wars which ran counter to the objectives of Canadian defence policies. Conversely, the Soviet 
fishing fleets were known to act as covers for Soviet submarines operating off the North 
American coast. Furthermore, Soviet fishermen were harvesting fish stocks from Canadian 
waters at an alarming and unsustainable rate. This was a major concern for the Canadian 
government and led fishery patrols to become one of the new priorities of MARCOM when its 
primary mission shifted to sovereignty operations.  
 Whereas the Soviet maritime forces were growing in the 1960s, those of the NATO 
alliance were in decline. At the onset of the Cold War, NATO’s conventional maritime assets 
outnumbered and were technologically far superior to their Warsaw Pact counterparts. More 
importantly, the Americans maintained a clear advantage in strategic nuclear weapons over the 
USSR so any shortcoming of the conventional forces on the Central Front could be compensated 
by the overwhelming nuclear arsenal. The Alliance’s reliance on nuclear weapons coupled with 
the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine led warships to be severely undervalued in the 
planning of NATO grand strategy. Any East-West conflict was expected to quickly escalate into 
an all-out nuclear war thus ASW forces whose main purpose was to sustain a long-term conflict 
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would be irrelevant. For this reason, few nations saw the need to invest large amounts of money 
for assets which were believed to have little practical use.  
As the USSR reached nuclear parity with the USA in the late 1960s, NATO adopted a 
new NATO grand strategy to reflect this change to the strategic situation. The new doctrine, 
named flexible or graduated response called for NATO forces to respond to Soviet aggression 
with a similar level of force.149 This strategy stemmed from the belief that neither side would risk 
a general nuclear war with a first strike. Instead, the usage of nuclear weapons would likely be 
the result of escalations from a conventional conflict. By responding to Soviet aggression with a 
similar level instead of greater level of force, it would theoretically discourage the pre-emptive 
use of nuclear weapons. For the doctrine to be effective, it required NATO members to maintain 
large conventional forces. This posed a significant problem for the Alliance’s military leadership, 
particularly SACLANT, as they did not have enough assets to meet all of NATO’s strategic 
requirements.150 The severe shortage of Allied maritime forces, particularly escort vessels such 
as destroyers and frigates, for the reasons listed above was alarming. While Alliance members 
had little appetite to increase defence expenditures at a time when inflation was rising drastically 
and there were strong societal pushes to increase social welfare services, most complied. 
Ironically, as NATO was set to rebuild the capabilities of its conventional forces in the late 
1960s, Canada was on the opposite course.151  
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Chapter 3.2 – The Advent of the Nuclear Age at Sea 
Much like the building of the first dreadnought battleship with its highspeed turbine 
engines and all-big-gun armament in 1905-06, the introduction of nuclear propulsion and 
weaponry revolutionized naval warfare from the late 1950s onward. On September 30, 1954, 
USS Nautilus, the first warship powered by nuclear energy in history entered service with the 
USN. Just three years later, the Soviets responded with the launch of its own SSN, the K-3. 
Nuclear submarines held a number of advantages compared to conventional submarines which 
made them a menace for ASW forces. SSNs could travel much faster and further without the 
need to refuel and were also much more difficult to detect using acoustic sensors because they 
were much quieter.  
The threat, moreover, increased exponentially with the fitting of submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBM) to the nuclear submarine, thereby creating a new class of submarines, 
the SSBNs. The world’s first SSBN, USS George Washington, entered service in December 1959 
which was followed shortly after by the Soviet’s Hotel-class SSBNs.152 These early SSBNs 
carried ballistic missiles with a range of 350-700 nautical miles which was sufficient to reach 
important inland targets. As a result, it became even more important that NATO’s ASW forces 
could locate and eliminate enemy SSBNs before they reached attack range. The Soviets caught 
up to US and British SSBN capabilities with the Yankee and Delta-class SSBNs that began to 
enter service in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These were truly strategic weapons which carried 
SLBMs with a range of thousands of miles.153 Though SSBNs are a platform capable of 
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performing both first and second-strike functions, it was widely perceived as a second-strike 
system because of its a first-strike survivability and the ability to retaliate with its own nuclear 
weapons.154 As to be discussed in Chapter Four, there was significant discourse among 
academics, politicians, and the military on how Canada should counter this new threat. 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons had significant influence on the posturing and 
composition of NATO and ultimately, Canada’s military forces. NATO analysts concluded that 
there were four possible scenarios of hostilities with the Soviet Union: a state of heightened 
global tension short of a full-scale war; a conventional war, a limited-nuclear war and an 
unlimited nuclear war.155 Each scenario posed a very different set of requirements for 
MARCOM’s operational capability. In an unlimited nuclear war scenario, there was very little 
that MARCOM could do as the destruction of Soviet SSBNs off the coast of North America may 
temporarily spare NATO second-strike assets or major civilian centres but would be meaningless 
on a strategic level. Instead, it was the responsibility of Canada and its allies to prevent this 
scenario by presenting a credible deterrence to Soviet aggression.156  
The adoption of the flexible response doctrine mentioned above did not preclude either 
the Alliance or the Warsaw Pact from the use of nuclear weapons; instead, it merely provided 
NATO commanders with a wider range of responses as opposed to the unrestricted use of 
nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet invasion.157 The by-product of the flexible response 
doctrine was an increased emphasis on the buildup of conventional forces and assets. More 
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importantly, it acknowledged the possibility of a prolonged conventional war with the Warsaw 
Pact. Studies by NATO staff on this possibility highlighted the importance of keeping the SLOC 
between North America and Western Europe open.  
To sustain a prolonged conflict would require tens of thousands of reinforcement 
personnel and millions of tons of supplies, the majority of which would have to be moved by 
commercial shipping. This remained the preferred mode of transportation for NATO planners as 
a single container ship could transport forty thousand metric tons of supplies compared to a mere 
hundred-fifty tons by the largest aircraft of the time. As an example, three cargo ships carried 
enough supplies to sustain an armoured division for an entire month.158 However, the new 
strategy also posed significant challenges into the defence of shipping. The emergence of 
satellites meant that the vastness of the oceans was no longer a refuge for large groups of 
ships.159 This made it easier for submarines to locate and interdict their targets which only further 
emphasised NATO’s need for adequate numbers of modern escorts. These developments had 
significant implications for MARCOM if it was to continue with the ASW/escort role. 
In a hypothetical Third Battle of the Atlantic, MARCOM’s roles would likely have 
resembled the first two battles in 1915-1918 and 1939-1945, albeit with newer technologies. The 
biggest threat to the continuation of the ASW/escort role had shifted to the potential use of 
nuclear weaponry. The use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea was more likely than their 
employment on land as there were virtually no concerns with civilian collateral damage or the 
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violation of the sovereign territories which might otherwise escalate the conflict.160 One possible 
use of nuclear weapons by the Soviets was to destroy the convoys carrying supplies and 
reinforcements across the Atlantic. The natural countermeasure would be to spread out the 
convoys so that a single nuclear weapon would not destroy all the ships. Paradoxically, this also 
made convoys highly exposed to attacks by conventional submarines which, as experience in the 
two world wars had shown, were highly capable in stealthy attacks on single ships when the 
defending forces were not nearby. Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, moreover, could severely 
damage or destroy the base and port facilities needed to operate the escort forces and commercial 
shipping, and to load and unload the merchant vessels. 161 The addition of nuclear technologies 
greatly complicated the situation which MARCOM contended with in the formulation of 
Canada’s maritime defence policy.  
Chapter 3.3 - The 1975 Defence Structure Review 
The bane of Canadian defence planning and policy had been the lack of long-term stable 
and secure funding. As previously mentioned, the unification of the Canadian Forces was a 
decision largely driven by the search for financial savings. While the immediate economies from 
the leaner force structure allowed for major procurement programs such as the four DDH-280 
Tribal-class destroyers and two Protecteur-class AOR ships to proceed, it did little to resolve the 
perpetual funding problems which plagued the Canadian military. In 1970, Trudeau matched the 
pay of soldiers with those of the bureaucracy. While the decision was widely celebrated by the 
rank and file, it also caused personnel costs to skyrocket at a time when the defence budget had 
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been frozen. However, the biggest threat to the defence program was the rapidly rising inflation 
during the late 1960s and early 70s which plunged the CAF into yet another financial crisis. 
The economics of defence are a critical if unappreciated aspect in the formulation of 
Canadian defence policy. While political considerations determined the objectives and priorities 
of the defence program as well as the means to meet them, economic considerations determined 
what could be afforded and what would be the most cost-effective way to achieve the goals.162 
Between FY 1968/69 and FY 1974/75, DND’s budget allocation rose sharply from $1.75 billion 
to $2.51 billion. The 43 percent increase in defence funding in peacetime was unprecedented; 
however, it was barely enough to keep pace with inflation which correspondingly had grew by 
nearly 40 percent during this same period. More importantly, despite significant increases in 
government revenue and expenditure, the military’s share of the total federal budget dropped 
from 17.8 percent to 8.6 percent.163 Had defence funding been maintained at the same level prior 
to FY 1968/69, DND’s budget would have amounted to approximately $5 billion and the 
financial crisis could have been avoided.  
  In the fall of 1973, Cabinet agreed to a new funding model for the Canadian Forces 
which saw the defence budget increased by 7 percent annually for the next five years in order to 
meet the responsibilities and objectives outlined in Defence in the 70s. However, global events 
outside of Canada’s control rendered this substantial increase to defence funding insufficient 
almost overnight.164 The 1973 Oil Crisis caused by the oil embargo imposed by OAPEC in 
response to Western support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War caused inflation to grow at 
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double-digit rates. By October 1974, only a year after it was implemented, it was evident that the 
new funding formula was insufficient to maintain the Canadian Forces. Rapidly rising 
operational and personnel costs took up most of the defence budget in FY 1973-74 which left 
virtually no money to procure capital equipment to maintain the fighting capability of the three 
elemental services.165 This development posed a significant problem for the Trudeau government 
who had committed to refitting the CAF with equipment more suitable for its sovereignty-first 
priorities.  
The financial problems of DND could have been easily resolved if its lack of funding was 
limited to the procurement of new equipment by postponing the purchase for several years. 
However, this was not an option as DND faced a $500 million shortfall for the 1975-76 Fiscal 
Year just to retain the existing force structure.166 Cabinet was forced to make a difficult choice to 
either institute another round of personnel reduction or to increase funding. One of the 
alternatives explored at this time was to institute another series of cuts to personnel level which 
would have reduced the strength of the Canadian Forces from 83,000 down to 73,000 soldiers. 
This proposal was unacceptable to the CDS Gen. Jacques Dextraze, who publicly warned that 
any further cuts would compromise the military’s ability to carry out its core functions and 
responsibilities.167 The proposed forced reductions would have had significant implications for 
MARCOM had it been adopted. On the Atlantic Coast where the bulk of MARCOM’s forces 
were stationed, the impact would have been less consequential as the austerity measures would 
result only in a 10 percent drop in surveillance capability due to a smaller operating budget and a 
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shortfall of sailors.168 The real impact would have been felt by the Pacific squadron as five of its 
seven destroyers would have to operate at reduced strength; ultimately translating into a 15 
percent drop in ship patrol capabilities.169 Given the already minimal assets and capabilities 
stationed on Canada’s Pacific Coast, this reduction would have devastating effect on the ability 
of MARCOM to carry out ASW and fishery patrols in the Pacific. Ultimately, this option was 
abandoned because the effects on the overall defence capability was too great. Instead, a 
compromise was reach and the strength of the military was reduced to 78,000 personnel as a 
temporary response to the fiscal crisis.  
A third alternative was to further cut back on NATO commitments. However, this too 
was rejected due to the massive implications it would have on the overall strategic situation, 
Canada’s relationship with its allies, and the commitment to collective security that was 
foundational to the country’s defence and foreign policies.170 With no other options available, 
Pierre Trudeau ordered a Defence Structure Review (DSR) to re-examine the roles and 
responsibilities of the Canadian Forces as well as the necessary force structure to fulfill them.171  
The first phase of review centered around five strategic questions about the operational 
capabilities of the CAF, three of which pertained to the roles of MARCOM: 172 
1. Should Canada maintain the capability to deploy forces to Europe and support 
them in combat during wartime? 
2. Should Canada be able to compel submarines in Canadian water to surface when 
ordered including the ability to sink them as a last resort if they refuse to? 
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3. Is it important for Canada to contribute to surveillance for intel or other reasons of 
potentially hostile submarine activities? 
These questions had significant implications on the design of Canadian defence and foreign 
policies as they largely concerned Canada’s NATO responsibilities. Though the Trudeau 
government announced its commitment to remain within the NATO alliance in Defence in the 
70s, there were significant doubts as to whether the CAF had the capability to carry out both its 
domestic and NATO functions given the limited resources, manpower and financial envelope it 
was allocated.  
At the end of Phase I, the DSR concluded that Canada should:  
1. Continue the deployment of Canadian forces to Western Europe in times of 
hostility, including provisions for escort protection during transit 
2. Maintain the capability to compel submarines in Canadian waters to surface when 
ordered  
3. Continue surveillance of hostile submarine activities to maintain an intelligence 
picture of what is occurring in Canadian waters.173  
In addition to these strategic capabilities, the DSR listed fifteen roles which the CAF must be 
capable of completing.  
The tasks assigned to MARCOM fell under three umbrella categories: sovereignty, North 
American defence and NATO. The DSR confirmed the objectives in Defence in the 70s and 
outlined specific tasks which needed to be fulfilled by MARCOM. The two main tasks 
associated with the sovereignty role were to 1) ensure adequate surveillance capability of 
Canadian territory, airspace and sea approaches and 2) reinforce civil authorities in the 
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enforcement and compliance of Canadian laws.174 Both tasks entailed operations of low-
intensity, but were extremely draining on the limited assets of MARCOM due to the frequency 
with which they needed to be conducted. The difficulties faced by MARCOM were amplified by 
the need to meet another set of responsibilities concurrently. 
Although ranked lower in priority than the sovereignty tasks, the tasks for the defence of 
North America and NATO responsibilities were much more demanding in terms of equipment 
and training. The foremost objective was to sustain the confidence of the USA and other allies 
which was a marked departure from Trudeau’s stance when he first became prime minister. The 
1975 DSR acknowledged that “Canada’s participation in collective security arrangements with 
other states not only defends the values we share with our friends but, equally, it serves the 
interest of Canada’s national security. If collective arrangements are to remain a useful option for 
all, each member state must remain confident that a collective response to common problems is 
clearly more conducive to international peace and stability than unilateral action.”175 A second 
paramount objective associated with NATO was to ensure that the development of Allied 
policies took into account Canada’s interests and needs.176 For Canada to be able to exert 
influence in the development of alliance grand strategy, it must be perceived by other Alliance 
members to be carrying an appropriate share of NATO’s collective defence activities.177 
The DSR listed three main operational objectives for MARCOM related to NATO and 
North American Defence. The first was to guard against a surprise attack on North America.178 
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In this capacity, the role of the CAF was to be on the lookout for signs of a potential attack on 
the USA. From a naval perspective, this entailed surface and sub-surface surveillance of 
Canadian waters for Soviet surface vessels or submarines. This could be conducted in 
conjunction with the sovereignty patrols previously discussed. An associated task was to 
contribute to the prevention of attacks aimed at US-land based second strike assets.179 As 
previously mentioned, global peace and stability was predicated on mutual nuclear deterrence 
between the USA and the USSR. If this balance was disrupted, the consequences were 
potentially cataclysmic.  
 The final operational task assigned to MARCOM was to prevent or contain attacks 
against NATO.180 The central concept of the Alliance was mutual defence with each member 
expected to contribute to the collective combat capability. Canada’s maritime contributions, 
despite Trudeau’s strategic re-orientation in 1970, had remained largely unchanged. 
Nevertheless, the decision to continue to participate in the strategic ASW/ escort role remained a 
controversial topic in Cabinet as its members were split on the necessity to ensure that the SLOC 
between North America and Western Europe remained open during wartime. The more 
nationalist-inclined members argued that Canada had no obligation to fulfil this function and that 
if MARCOM needed new ships, it should only be for sovereignty-related purposes.181 Other 
members argued that as a member of a collective defence arrangement, it had an obligation to 
come to the defence of all its allies which included maintaining the SLOC.182 Unlike in 1970, 
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Trudeau accepted that both strategic ASW and maintaining the SLOC were essential aspects of 
Canada’s defence policy.  
 Phase II of the Defence Structure Review examined the force structure necessary to fulfill 
the tasks stated in Phase I. The size of MARCOM’s fleet was largely determined by the threat 
level which Canada could be expected to face, the level of commitment required from the service 
and the intensity of these activities.183 A vessel can only conduct one role in one location at any 
time; therefore, the number of vessels which MARCOM operated would also have a significant 
impact on the capabilities of the service. Rear Admiral (ret’d) Robert Timbrell made the case that 
Canada needed a significantly larger fleet if it was to be an effective naval power that was 
capable of fulfilling all its assigned responsibilities. He proposed a fleet of thirty-six destroyers, 
ten submarines and four AOR ships as an appropriate fleet size for Canada.184 However, this was 
an extremely expensive proposition given that two dozen new warships needed to be acquired. In 
addition, it would necessitate a massive increase to MARCOM’s funding to cover the increase in 
personnel and operating costs, lifecycle costs, and the infrastructure expansion necessary to 
support Timbrell’s proposed fleet. However, at the policy level, this was never an option that was 
seriously considered by senior DND officials or by Cabinet.  
DND studies demonstrated that to fulfil both the sovereignty and NATO role in 
peacetime, the fleet would need a minimum of twenty-six destroyers. In wartime, this figure rose 
to thirty warships.185 However, based on the personnel staffing level, available infrastructure and 
defence envelope, MARCOM only had the capability to support a fleet of twenty-four 
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destroyers. Amongst the proposed fleet, only twenty would be operational while four would be 
held in reserves until they were needed due to fiscal restrictions. This would become the final 
fleet figure which was agreed upon for the CPF project.186 The shortfall in ships put considerable 
stress on the operational capability of MARCOM which due to the duality of functions already 
had an extremely high operational tempo.  
In 1977, MARCOM possessed twenty active destroyers with three more in reserve status 
that could be activated within ninety days. However, due to refits, training and NATO 
secondment, not all of the ships would be immediately available for operation if hostilities broke 
out suddenly. Canada had agreed to permanently provide one destroyer to STANAVFORLANT 
on a rotational basis and up to four in times of rising tension.187 Furthermore, in order to 
maintain its proficiency in ASW, MARCOM determined that it was necessary to devote half of 
its at-sea times for combat training. This meant that at any given time, 25 percent of 
MARCOM’s ships were at sea on training cruises.188 The biggest obstacle to the availability of 
Canadian destroyers, however, was the lengthy maintenance cycles of the ships.  
The maintenance schedule for MARCOM’s warship operated in a 48-month cycle. Once 
every four years, a destroyer would receive a 26-week major refit, 4-additional weeks of shore 
time followed by a 10-week sea trial period before it was returned to service.189 This meant that 
at any given time, 20 percent of the destroyer fleet would be out of service. In addition to the 
major refits, each vessel received a 3-week maintenance every quarter while shore leave was also 
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allocated monthly to improve the morale of the crews. Thus, during a three-month period, a 
destroyer would not be available for operations for an additional thirty-seven days. As such, 
unless sufficient warning was given prior to the initiation of hostilities, the operational capability 
of MARCOM would be severely compromised. Although this situation was far from ideal, it was 
the reality with which MARCOM had to contend.  
With the completion of the Defence Structure Review, Cabinet directed the Minister of 
National Defence to prepare preliminary studies for a future ship replacement program on 
November 20, 1975 which marked the beginning for the Ship Replacement Program (SRP).190 
Over the next two years, MARCOM officials laboured through a difficult process to define the 
requirements for the next generation of Canadian warships. The process was complicated by the 
duality of the navy’s functions as well as the intense debates which occurred within MARCOM 
over the future of the service. In December 1977, Barney Danson secured cabinet’s approval to 
proceed with the project which formally initiated the CPF program.  
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Chapter 4 – A New Beginning: Defining the Requirements of the 
Canadian Patrol Frigates, 1975 – 1977 
“We may assert that a state bounded by the sea, which does not have a navy corresponding to its 
importance in the world, thereby shows its economic weakness. Thus, each ship of a navy is a relative 
indication of the level of development of science, technology and industry in a given country and an 
indicator of its real military might.”191 – Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, Admiral of the Fleet of the USSR 
 
The quote by Admiral Goshkov highlighted the importance of a credible navy not just for 
the defence of the nation but also as a symbol of political and economic strength. Trudeau 
realized in 1975 that the token contribution of Canadian assets and personnel to NATO was 
insufficient to sustain the confidence of its allies, which was further undermined by the dismal 
state of the CAF. Instead, the contributions must be tangible, modern and capable to achieve the 
desired results. The majority of the ships in the fleet were at or nearing the end of their expected 
twenty-years operational life with no replacements in sight. The degradation of MARCOM was 
so complete that in 1980, an officer remarked that “in a real war the best the Canadian navy 
could hope for was to be trapped in Halifax harbour by mines: with any luck, by the time 
Americans arrived to sweep the mines, the war might be over.”192 The government’s decision to 
proceed with the Ship Replacement Program (SRP) which eventually became the Canadian 
Patrol Frigate Program, was long overdue. 
As the SRP got underway, the burning question which needed to be addressed was what 
type of warship should the government procure? Defence in the 70s established that the 
protection of Canadian sovereignty was now the foremost task of MARCOM. However, the 
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change in the service’s primary mission did not mean the elimination or reduction of its other 
commitments. The prime objective of CAF remained to contribute to the deterrence of both 
conventional and nuclear war in conjunction with its NATO allies.193 Furthermore, despite 
Trudeau’s prior aversion of the Alliance and the strategic ASW role which had been assigned to 
MARCOM, he made it clear that the government had no intentions of abandoning these 
responsibilities. This created a duality of roles for MARCOM, one which could not be easily 
addressed because each required a very different ship to fulfill.  
The infrequency and prohibitively expensive costs of major naval procurement programs 
meant that the decision made by the Trudeau government would have grave implications for 
Canada’s maritime policies, and MARCOM’s operational capability for decades to come.194 In 
December 1977 after much deliberation, the Trudeau government announced its intention to 
procure six new patrol frigates for MARCOM. The purpose of this program was to replace the 
six remaining St. Laurent-class destroyers which had entered service beginning in 1955 and was 
intended to be the first phase of a larger project to replace the remainder of Canada’s aging fleet. 
The procurement of warships is a massive undertaking which requires many years of planning 
and preparation before the ships enter service. The experience of previous DND-administered 
procurement programs left much to be desired and a new procurement strategy was implemented 
for the CPF project to ensure the failures of the past did not resurface. The decision to acquire 
large ASW-focused warships – the new frigates would be nearly twice the size of the destroyers 
they were replacing – was a decision which would have been unfathomable only several years 
prior and further demonstrated the maturation of Pierre Trudeau as prime minister.  
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Chapter 4.1 – A Two-Edged Sword: The Duality of Canada’s Maritime Role Under 
Pierre Trudeau 
For much of its history, the foremost responsibility of the RCN and its successor 
formation, MARCOM was anti-submarine warfare. At first, this was due to operational necessity 
as Germany’s unrestricted submarine policies in the First and Second World War forced the 
RCN to devote all its resources to counter this threat. This trend continued in the early post-war 
era as the Soviet Navy adopted the German’s submarine focus and had rapidly built up its 
underwater fleet.195 However, with the advent of nuclear weaponry and ballistic missiles, the 
threat posed by submarines had completely changed. In addition to the tactical threat posed by 
submarines, there was now a strategic dimension involved. SSBNs had the capability to 
devastate its targets from hundreds of miles away and were virtually unstoppable. SSBNs were 
also considered the most effective second-strike platform of the nuclear triad (bombers, ICBMs 
and SLBMs) and thus were perceived as the foundation of the mutual nuclear deterrence which 
allowed détente to take hold. As such, there was a growing belief amongst policy advisors, 
academics and politicians that MARCOM’s strategic ASW orientation was a highly expensive 
but increasingly obsolete specialization which did not serve Canadian interests well.196  
There was significant discourse between the more alliance-oriented defence officials and 
domestic-oriented academics on the future role of MARCOM. The tactical ASW role had long 
been accepted by Canadian military leaders and defence officials without question.197 It was 
what originally provided the RCN the justification it needed to press for more warships in the 
1950s. In the subsequent years, significant investments had been made to ensure that MARCOM 
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was still one of the leading ASW forces in the world despite the many problems it faced. 
Furthermore, it was Canada’s most valuable contribution to NATO and the only legitimate 
justification for the continued investment in Canada’s naval service. For the academic 
community, the country’s strict adherence to strategic ASW was perplexing given the evolution 
of strategic nuclear weapons and their effects on the conduct of future conflicts. Furthermore, the 
practicality or usefulness of the policy had never been subjected to serious strategic analysis. Dr. 
John McLin, one of Canada’s leading defence commenters at the time, bluntly stated “No 
compelling justification was given of the strategy upon which the anti-submarine capability was 
based; no effective answer was given, either, to those who questioned whether the particular 
collection of ships and aircrafts assembled by the early 1960s for conducting ASW operation 
represented a well-considered policy.”198  
The case against the continuation of Canada’s strategic ASW role largely took form in 
three arguments. The first was that the number of SLBMs that the Soviets possessed was 
miniscule in comparison to its stockpile of ICBMs. If the latter cannot be stopped, what was the 
point in neutralizing the former?199 The second argument revolved around the fact that SSBNs 
represented the Soviet’s most effective second-strike platform and the need for both NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact to both maintain a credible retaliatory capability which was the foundation of 
the nuclear balance. If Canada’s strategic ASW mission were to be successful, it would mean 
that the Soviet’s second-strike capability had been rendered ineffective and thus the loss of its 
nuclear deterrence credibility.200 In such a situation, the strategic balance would be tipped in 
favour of the USA and NATO which would force the USSR to resort to more extreme measures 
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to restore the balance. The third argument against the conduct of strategic ASW was that the 
technical difficulties and exorbitant costs necessary to maintain the capability to detect, locate 
and destroy Soviet SSBNs were too great in comparison to the meagre return.201  
Trudeau’s senior advisor, Ivan Head, presented a similar argument in Canadian Defence 
Policy: A Review where he argued that the ASW operations conducted by MARCOM were 
counterintuitive to the preservation of the strategic nuclear balance. If Soviet SSBNs no longer 
posed a credible second-strike capability, it could alter the balance of power and threaten the 
stability of mutual nuclear deterrence.202 Instead, he proposed the reorganization of MARCOM 
into what effectively was a glorified constabulary focused on the protection of national 
sovereignty. Under this proposal, MARCOM would be reduced to a fleet of twelve destroyers 
and two AOR ships while the number of naval personnel would be nearly halved from eleven 
thousand to just six thousand sailors.203 Although Head recognized the importance of strategic 
ASW to the protection of the USA’s own second strike capability, he was unconvinced of the 
need for Canada to contribute.204  
Pierre Trudeau himself was skeptical of Canada’s continued participation in the 
ASW/escort role because it would only be useful in a drawn-out conventional war. Such a 
scenario was considered unlikely given the proliferation of nuclear arms by both hegemonic 
powers.205 During a briefing by the Director-General of Operations, Maritime on May 20, 1969, 
he posed the question “if it was assumed that Canadian destroyers could closely identify and 
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track Soviet submarines and if it were assumed that no offensive action would be taken by 
Canadian destroyers, then what value would there be in acquiring knowledge of the submarine’s 
location?”206 Furthermore, he challenged that “destroyers only become totally effective if they 
can attack and destroy. If Canadian destroyers attacked in the first instance without warning then 
the allies would have instigated a nuclear attack. That possibility must then be ruled out. If 
destroyers were attacking submarines, then it must be assumed that a nuclear exchange through 
ICBMs or bombers had already taken place. At that point it would be difficult to maintain that 
there was any deterrent value in the destroyer program…”207 With no valid justification for the 
continuation of the ASW role, Trudeau and his advisors increasingly focused their attention on a 
new domestic role for the nation’s maritime forces. 
The sovereignty role envisioned by Trudeau for MARCOM was comprised of two 
functions: surveillance and control. Surveillance referred to the detection and identification of 
potentially hostile entities to gather intelligence of what is occurring in Canada’s landmass, 
airspace and waters. Control referred to the appropriate enforcement actions to ensure that 
Canadian laws and regulations were respected.208 The major challenges to Canadian control over 
the waters it declared as sovereign and which it exercised jurisdiction over were increased illegal 
exploitation of natural resources such as fish stocks and mineral resources on the seabed, the 
unwanted or unannounced presence of foreign vessels in the High Arctic and the disregard of 
Canadian laws and regulations by commercial vessels.209 The responsibility to combat these 
violations of Canadian sovereignty were generally within the purview of civilian agencies such 
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as the Department of Fisheries and Environment (DFE) and the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG). 
MARCOM’s duty was to support them in the enforcement of Canadian laws and if necessary, to 
take over these responsibilities.210  
Canada is by default a maritime nation due to its geography and is heavily dependent on 
the seas for its economic wellbeing. Approximately a quarter of Canada’s GNP was generated by 
trade, with over half of these goods transported by merchant shipping.211 The volume of goods 
moved by seaborne shipping in 1973 totalled approximately two hundred million tons and was 
valued at $60 billion dollars.212 An average of sixty-four major oceangoing merchant ships 
entered and departed Canadian seaports each day to move these goods.213 Canada was also one 
of the largest seafood exporters in the world. Furthermore, like most other Western nations at the 
time, Canada was dependent on imported oil to meet its energy needs, to the tune of twenty-three 
million tons of oil annually.214 Canada’s dependency on the seas meant that its economy was 
extremely vulnerable to interference and influences by hostile forces. Should Canada fail to 
effectively exercise its sovereignty, it was expected that the USN would take over in order to 
assure American security. This was considered a politically unacceptable situation as it would 
undermine Canada’s claims of jurisdiction over ocean areas adjacent to its coasts.215 
The vastness of Canada made it a logistical and operational nightmare to maintain 
constant surveillance over its territories and sovereign waters. This challenge was exacerbated by 
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the Trudeau government’s international leadership in asserting jurisdiction over zones far beyond 
the twelve-mile limit of territorial waters. In 1970, the Trudeau government passed the Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act which created a one-hundred-mile pollution control zone in 
Canadian Arctic waters with the enforcement of this act tasked to MARCOM. This was followed 
by the expansion of the Economic Exclusive Zone from three miles off the coast to twelve miles 
in 1973, which was further expanded to two hundred miles offshore in 1977. Within a single 
decade, the area MARCOM was responsible for patrolling had increased immensely yet no 
additional resources were allocated to the service.216 As the Canadian government continued to 
increase the waters it claimed as its own, the matter of sovereignty became more important as its 
claims were not recognized by international laws.  
Another legal matter which needed to be resolved was the ownership of resources such as 
minerals and oil on the seabed. International laws on this matter were unclear and while the 
technology to locate and extract these resources had not yet fully matured, it was expected that a 
fierce race to secure and exploit these reserves would occur in the near future. Canada likely 
could not depend on its allies such as the USA as they were more likely to be adversaries in the 
competition for the extraction of natural resources from the sea floor.217 Furthermore, if Canada 
was unable to effectively maintain surface and sub-surface control over Canadian waters and was 
instead reliant on allies to fill the capability gap, it would significantly weaken its claims.218 If 
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Canada wished to retain effective control over its claimed territory, it must actively patrol and 
enforce its jurisdiction within these waters.  
In testimony before the Lafond Commission in 1983, the Commissioner of the Canadian 
Coast Guard, Vice Admiral (ret’d) A.L. Collier, testified that the current “[CCG] ships are not 
even built for enforcement of our national laws.”219 None of its ships were armed and only thirty-
seven of fifty ships had the range to operate two hundred miles from the Canadian coast.220 
Furthermore, CCG crews were civilians who had little experience in the enforcement of 
Canadian law. In short, the coast guard was grossly ill-equipped to effectively protect Canadian 
sovereign waters and as such, the responsibility fell to MARCOM. However, the dismal state of 
MARCOM meant that it was only marginally better suited for this responsibility than the coast 
guard.  
Canada’s Atlantic patrol area alone totalled approximately 1.6 million square miles. 221 
This vast area was patrolled by a mere twelve destroyers, of which only four were on station at 
any given time. In 1977, the former commander of MARCOM, Rear Admiral (ret’d) Robert 
Timbrell lambasted the government’s sovereignty patrol policy as a sham. The monthly patrols 
undertaken by MARCOM’s warships did little to enforce Canadian control over the waters it 
claimed or to deter the actions of foreign states in them.222 The infrequency of these patrols 
meant that foreign vessels could exploit the natural resources and leave without ever being 
detected by Canadian authorities. Instead, these patrols only contributed to the wearing out of the 
ships and crew. The patrols in the High Arctic were particularly damaging as the destroyers’ 
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hulls were not designed for operations in ice. The constant need to be at sea also put a massive 
strain on the manpower of MARCOM. In 1977, Canada’s maritime service was comprised of 
approximately nine thousand regular force sailors and three thousand reservists, of which six and 
a half thousand were committed for sea duty.223 The high operational tempo meant that ships 
were either sent on patrol understaffed or sailors were constantly rotated amongst ships to ensure 
that minimal crew numbers were met. As such, there were few opportunities for shore leave or 
for land-based training which contributed to a precipitous drop in morale.224  
In peacetime, Canada’s main naval NATO commitments were to assign ships to 
STANAVFORLANT on a rotational basis and to conduct surveillance patrols to ensure that 
Soviet submarines were unable to carry out surprise attacks on American nuclear assets. In times 
of tensions and hostilities, Canadian maritime assets would be placed under the command of 
NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander – Atlantic (SACLANT), a USN admiral with a multi-
national staff that included Canadian officers based in Virginia, who would then distribute the 
ships to lower-level commands as operational needs dictated. The commander of MARCOM 
would also act as the NATO Commander, Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area. Despite Trudeau’s initial 
desire for change, the technical limitations of most of the Canadian ships meant that there were 
only a few roles that they were capable of fulfilling. MARCOM retained its original NATO 
responsibilities only because it lacked the ability to effectively contribute to collective defence 
through other means and the refusal of the government to invest in the requisite equipment to do 
so.  
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Contrary to the opinions held by some, the sovereignty patrols undertaken by Canadian 
warships in support of the coast guard and other government departments did in fact have 
significant military value as they allowed MARCOM to gain intelligence on the surface and sub-
surface activities carried out by foreign nations in Canadian waters. Both American and Soviet 
nuclear submarines were known to traverse in the waters of the High Arctic without prior 
disclosure to Canadian authorities. The movement of the latter was particularly important as 
knowledge of the movement of Soviet SSBNs was a vital part of Canada’s NATO 
responsibilities. In peacetime, Soviet submarines had the right to remain submerged in the waters 
along the North American coast indefinitely due to the principle of freedom of the seas.225 As sea 
denial was not an option, the only thing which NATO forces could do about Soviet submarines 
was to maintain constant surveillance to ensure that they were not in a position to launch a 
sudden attack.226 The monitoring of Soviet fishing fleets in conjunction with DFE was another 
particularly important task because as previously mentioned, these vessels were known to assist 
Soviet submarines operating off the Atlantic coast. The level of effort, set at 370 ships days 
annually, highlighted the importance of this task.227  
The duality of Canada’s maritime roles was confirmed by the 1975 Defence Structure 
Review. This posed a significant problem for MARCOM as it sought to define the requirements 
of its new warships, largely because they fundamentally required two different types of vessels. 
For the protection of Canadian sovereignty, a lightly armed medium-sized patrol ship was 
considered to be most suitable for the role. However, such a vessel had no warfighting capability 
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nor did it contribute the overall NATO deterrence capability.228 Conversely, larger combat-
capable destroyers designed to carry out the NATO responsibilities were unsuitable for mundane 
sovereignty patrols as it represented an inefficient use of valuable assets.229 The new warships 
which the Trudeau government sought to acquire through the SRP would need to be capable of 
completing both roles and ignited a number of interesting debates on how best to address this 
conundrum. 
Chapter 4.2 – Competing Visions: The Debates Surrounding Canada’s Next Warships 
The central problem in the acquisition of new warships was how best to address the 
operational requirements of the service. An examination of the Canadian Defence Quarterly, the 
professional journal of the Canadian Armed Forces revealed a number of submissions by serving 
naval officers on the course they believed MARCOM should pursue. Two of the most prominent 
officers were Lieutenant Commanders S.T. Jessen and R.H. Thomas. Both argued that given the 
limited fiscal envelope and the strategic situation, Canada had no choice but to consider the 
procurement of smaller, multi-purpose ships as opposed to dedicated ASW ships.230 While less 
capable than a specialized vessel, general-purpose vessels would have the operational flexibility 
and capabilities to conduct both sovereignty patrols and conduct ASW operations at a 
moderately effective level.  
Lieutenant Commander Jessen’s argument centered around the fact that large ASW 
destroyers were not cost-effective for the sovereignty patrols to which the government gave 
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priority.231 He supported that priority, citing the view of some analysts that strategic ASW 
patrols destabilized deterrence by threatening the Soviet second strike capabilities (see Chapter 
4.1). Furthermore, the existing warships which required crews of 230 for the older destroyers and 
280 for the new DDH 280s, were extremely expensive to operate for low-intensity sovereignty 
missions.232 DND had committed to providing DFE with 370 ships days of patrol annually in 
addition to the service’s own training days, NATO deterrence patrols and other commitments, 
leading to very high operating costs. In FY 1974-75, MARCOM’s personnel and operating cost 
made up 92 percent of the service’s budget which left a meagre 8 percent for capital purchase. It 
would have been impossible for MARCOM to acquire new warships had the trend continued 
unless additional drastic measures were taken. By FY 1977/78 when the CPF project was 
approved, MARCOM’s spending on capital equipment had scantly improved to 12 percent of the 
service’s budget.233 A medium-sized general-purpose vessel could complete the same task much 
more effectively at a lower cost.  
Lieutenant Commander Thomas, by contrast, noted that the trend was for warships to 
become larger to accommodate new sensors and weapons, with the result that they were capable 
of fulfilling more responsibilities.234 Thus, although dramatic increases in the cost of each ship 
meant fewer vessels could be procured, these fewer ships could carry out the roles of larger 
numbers of earlier and less capable ships.235 Certainly MARCOM’s limited financial envelope 
meant that it could only acquire a limited number of highly advanced modern warships. There 
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was, however, a limit to the trade-off for quality over quantity: a single ship, no matter how 
capable, can only be in one place at any given time. With the vast expanse of waters that 
MARCOM was required to patrol, the number of ships available was a major factor in the design 
of Canada’s maritime policies.  
Lieutenant Commander Thomas cited the British Type 21 frigate as a possible design that 
met Canada’s operational requirements.236 It was a medium sized general-purpose frigate with a 
displacement of approximately 2750 tons, had the requisite range and was able to carry a 
helicopter, which was a core component of MARCOM’s ASW capability. However, it was never 
considered a serious option because it did not meet the specifications which will be outlined in 
Chapter 4.3. Instead, studies conducted by DND suggested that a variant of the USN’s Oliver 
Hazard Perry-class frigates (FFG-7) was the only vessel which met both the service’s needs and 
budget.237  
Cabinet was also interested in the acquisition of a smaller vessel as the replacement for 
the aging destroyers and instructed defence minister Danson to investigate this possibility for the 
Ship Replacement Program in 1975. In its submission to Cabinet in November 1977, DND 
examined three alternatives: a fleet entirely comprised of sovereignty-patrol vessels, a fleet of 
warships, or a mixed fleet. Military officers, however, were unreservedly opposed to the 
acquisition of patrol ships for MARCOM, stating that “As lightly armed patrol ships cannot 
perform any tasks in which hostile action is expected or contribute to deterrence, the patrol 
vessels would be in addition to and not a replacement for the minimum combat capable fleet 
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required.”238 Furthermore, “The employment of patrol vessels for sovereignty does not exploit 
the flexibility of warships and in fact, wastes the spare capacity of the ships that is available in 
peace.” 239 The mixed fleet option was also dismissed because of the substantially higher 
infrastructure costs necessary to operate and maintain two different types of vessels.240 As such, 
it was determined that only a fleet of warships was capable of meeting all of Canada’s needs 
within the existing fiscal envelope.  
The decision on whether to design and build the proposed warship in Canada or to 
procure it from a foreign shipyard was the source of much contention. There were several 
advantages with procuring an off-the-shelf design from abroad. First, they entailed less risk 
because the design was mature and, in many cases, had already seen service with another navy. 
This meant that all the costs were known and the only expenditure would be to modify the design 
to meet Canada’s requirements. Second, Canada would benefit from an established supply chain 
for spare parts. Third, the vessel would be interoperable with other allied ships. Lastly, the ships 
would be able to enter service much sooner, without the years of lead time required for design in 
Canada and the development of the necessary shipyard capacity and expertise. For these reasons, 
an off-the-shelf design was the preferred option amongst military officers. 
Others had doubts as to the capability of Canadian industry to carry out this momentous 
task. The Minister of State for Science and Technology (MOSST) Judd Buchanan was strongly 
opposed to the design and construction of warships in Canada. He argued that due to the cuts in 
the navy’s technical branches since the mid 1960s, and the insufficiency of navy orders to sustain 
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the Canadian shipbuilding industry, neither DND nor industry retained the necessary managerial 
and technical expertise to conduct such a project.241 He argued that “from a Canadian industrial 
standpoint…. this course of action makes little, if any sense. No Canadian company possesses 
the breadth of skills to undertake on its own the design, development and integration of the 
communications sensors and weapons system required for a modern fighting vessel of this 
type.”242 Furthermore, he stated that while such a product would appear to be Canadian, it would 
instead be an amalgam of foreign technology and equipment which did little to promote or 
develop Canadian industries.243 Instead, he advocated for Canada to work with interested NATO 
partners to design and develop the frigate. He argued that such a course of action would not only 
lower costs due to a larger ship class but it would improve support capabilities and potentially 
lead to export orders which would sustain the industry in the long term.244 Despite Minister 
Buchanan’s opposition to the plan, for a variety of political and pragmatic reasons, Cabinet chose 
to proceed in a very different direction. 
 In a discussion paper submitted to Cabinet in October 1977, the Department of Industry, 
Trade and Commerce presented a case for the ships to be built in Canada. The CPF project 
would create or sustain three thousand jobs in the shipyards and even more in the supply chains 
necessary to serve the project; these economic activities would be lost if the ships were built 
abroad.245 The built-in Canada option would contribute an additional $549.8 million in economic 
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benefits within Canada compared to the built offshore option.246 It would also generate an 
additional $53.9 million in tax revenue and save the government $29.7 million in unemployment 
insurance payments for a net total of $83.6 million.247 Furthermore, as Cabinet debated how to 
proceed with the CPF project, the state of the Canadian shipbuilding industry undoubtedly 
played a role in their decision-making. Due to a global recession and a large drop in demand for 
new commercial ships, the outlook of the Canadian shipbuilding industry was very bleak and 
likely would have collapsed in the near future without government intervention.  
DND similarly supported the built-in-Canada option for pragmatic reasons.248 Although 
procurement of a proven design from another country would be cheaper and deliver warships 
sooner, DND officials argued that there were over-riding disadvantages.249 First, there would be 
little benefit for the Canadian economy and industrial capacity.250 Since the Second World War, 
when the Canadian navy had great difficulty obtaining the latest equipment from Britain and the 
United States, or space in their shipyards for construction or refits beyond the capacity of 
Canada’s industry, the Canadian government, and in particular, the RCN/MARCOM, had been 
keen to maintain a domestic shipbuilding and repair industry which it could turn to in times of 
crisis. Secondly, DND was worried about the downstream effect should a foreign warship be 
procured, particularly for refits and repairs. Lifecycle costs amounted to over half of the total 
project cost and if these needed to be carried out by foreign dockyards due to specialized parts or 
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facilities, the cost estimates could rise significantly. Last, ships designed for a foreign navy were 
less likely to meet specific Canadian requirements. The seas of the North Atlantic and High 
Arctic feature unique environmental factors which if not properly addressed would have 
significant impact on the operational capability of the frigates.251 Based on these factors, DND 
recommended that unless a foreign design met Canadian requirements at a significantly lower 
cost, the Government should pursue a domestically designed and built warship.  
When questioned by his Cabinet colleagues on why DND preferred a domestically 
designed warship over an off-the shelf option, Barney Danson replied that existing designs 
would be at least 5-10 years old before construction started which would make them 13-18 years 
old even before the ships entered service.252 The rapid pace at which technology advanced meant 
that the ship would be obsolete even quicker and there would be major complications in securing 
the necessary logistical support to sustain the ships over the course of the 25-year life cycle.253 
Furthermore, these designs were not built to Canadian specifications and would require 
substantial modifications in order to suit MARCOM’s needs.254 There were also political reasons 
why the next generation of MARCOM’s warships should be designed and built within Canada 
and these will be explored in the next chapter. 
The journey to develop the SOR for the Canadian Patrol Frigates was long and arduous 
as evident by the many competing visions on how MARCOM and DND should proceed with the 
program. However, the debates examined in this subchapter constituted only a small portion of 
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the overall discussions surrounding the direction of the SRP. The many voices from relevant 
stakeholders as well as military and political considerations resulted in a lengthy consultation 
period before the requirements of the CPFs were finally defined and presented to Cabinet in 
1977.  
Chapter 4.3 – The Requirements of the Canadian Patrol Frigates 
 The most important office in the formulation of the SOR of the Canadian Patrol Frigates 
was the Chief of Maritime Operations and Doctrine (CMDO) which in 1977, was held by Rear 
Admiral Charles Thomas.255 This was not an easy task and the debates on the direction of the 
program, particularly whether Canada should acquire sovereignty vessels or patrol frigates, 
weighed heavily on the CMDO and his staff. The limited financial envelope of DND and 
MARCOM meant that it could only afford to acquire one type of vessel. In its submission to 
Cabinet in November 1977, DND unequivocally stated its opposition to the acquisition of 
sovereignty vessels to replace its destroyer fleet. Instead, it recommended the acquisition of a 
large frigate, stating that “although the first priority on the use of Canadian maritime forces in 
peacetime is the protection of Canadian sovereignty, the basic character of these forces must be 
determined by their NATO deterrence and combat roles.”256 The most interesting aspect in the 
preparation of the SOR by CMDO was how similar the requirements for both a sovereignty 
vessel and a patrol frigate were.  
 There were a number of essential capabilities for Canada’s surface combatants regardless 
of the option chosen by Cabinet. The first was the ability to exert its presence in an area for a 
 
255 The SOR is not the technical requirements of the CPFs. Instead, they are just broad parameters which the bidders 
for the project have to meet. As to be detailed later, the CPF program requires the contractors to come up with 
solutions to meet DND’s operational requirements.  
256 “Discussion Paper – Maritime Forces Surface Requirements (DND-8-77DP),” Vol 74, File 11, 13, Barney 
Danson Fonds, R13905-1415-0-E, LAC. 
Ma 96 
 
 
 
prolonged period of time.257 Given the vast expanse of waters for which MARCOM was 
responsible, this meant that the vessel had to possess both excellent endurance and range as well 
as the ability to operate in all the environmental conditions within its area of operation (AO).258 
The vastness of MARCOM’s AO also meant that its ships had to be capable of operating at 
relatively high speeds in order to quickly respond to situations anywhere in Canadian waters. 
Furthermore, it also had to have the ability to escort or shadow other surface vessels and be 
sufficiently armed to respond when challenged.259 Another mandatory requirement was to be 
capable of carrying the large CH-124 Sea King helicopter (and any future replacements, which 
would likely be at least as large) and operate the aircraft in all-weather conditions. This was vital 
as helicopters magnified the area which could be patrolled by a single vessel by a factor of 
fifteen times compared to a vessel without one.260  
The sovereignty role assigned to MARCOM in Defence in the 70s required the navy to, 
amongst other duties, provide back-up for civilian enforcement agencies, conduct fishery patrols 
and prevent the exploitation of natural resources within Canada. This meant that at the minimum, 
a patrol vessel needed to be able to operate in all sea conditions found in Canadian waters as well 
as be able to keep pace with commercial cargo and fishing vessels.261 Additionally, the 1975 
DSR also affirmed that as part of the sovereignty role, MARCOM’s vessels should be capable of 
detecting, tracking and if necessary, sinking hostile submarines operating in the nation’s 
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sovereign waters.262 To be able to effectively meet all these requirements, a sovereignty patrol 
ship needed to be able to attain a maximum speed of 30 knots, including the ability to perform all 
assigned tasks at 25 knots in conditions up to and including Sea State 5. 263 Other operational 
requirements included the endurance to be on patrol for up to two weeks at a distance of five 
hundred nautical miles away from its base and the ability to act as a scene commander to direct 
the operations of other ships, helicopters and aircraft in the area. This required the ship to possess 
a moderate command and control capability. A sovereignty patrol vessel was not expected to be 
an effective submarine hunter-killer. Instead, it would carry basic sensory equipment to locate, 
identify and track both surface and subsurface vessels that had already been detected by other 
means such as aircraft or SOSUS.264 To be able to achieve all the stated capabilities, it would 
require a vessel with a displacement of at least 3200 tons. In broad terms, the requirements for an 
effective sovereignty patrol vessel were essentially those of a scaled down warship.  
 The requirements for a surface combatant while similar to a sovereignty vessel, were 
much more stringent due to the wider breadth of responsibilities it was expected to fulfill and the 
higher intensity of these activities. In order to be an effective convoy escort vessel, the ship must 
be able to at least keep pace with the vessels it was protecting. Most commercial vessels were 
capable of maintaining 25 knots in conditions up to sea state 5 due to their massive size which 
meant that the speed requirement of a surface warship suitable for the ASW/escort role was 28 
knots in sea state 2 and 25 knots at sea state 5.265 The trans-Atlantic nature of its escort roles also 
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meant that a frigate was required to have significantly longer endurance than a patrol vessel. As 
such, it needed to have the storage facility to carry stores and supplies for up to ninety days.  
  The main difference between a sovereignty patrol ship and a combat-capable frigate 
rested in its onboard sensory suites and weaponry. The former carried basic sensors and limited 
armament for self-defence. In contrast, a patrol frigate primarily designed as an ASW vessel 
needed to be able to actively detect, locate and identify subsurface threats without the assistance 
of other systems. This required a specialized sensory suite that included an array of hull-mounted 
and towed sonar systems. To engage the threats it identified, it became necessary for the vessel 
to carry ASW weaponry on-board. Furthermore, while the ASW/ convoy escort function was the 
primary role of MARCOM, its warships must also have the flexibility to conduct other 
assignments as SACLANT’s needs dictated. In order to be effective warship in a modern war 
and not be a hindrance to the other ships in the task force, the frigate was required to possess 
sufficient anti-air and anti-surface weaponry to capably defend itself from missiles and other 
threats. In order to house all of the requisite weapons, sensors and electronic systems, it required 
a vessel with a minimum displacement of approximately four thousand tons.266  
 The large size requirement for Canada’s newest warships was also determined by the 
environment in which they were expected to operate. The North Atlantic is a perilous region 
where for up to 60 percent of the year, Sea State 4 is the most common condition which meant 
high winds, rough seas, low visibility as well as sub-zero temperatures.267 The RCN’s experience 
in the Second World War demonstrated that small vessels such as corvettes which had a 
displacement of approximately one thousand tons, were technically capable of operating in such 
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conditions. However, they were also battered by these conditions which made it a horrifying and 
debilitating experience for its sailors. Studies conducted by the RCN and MARCOM in 
subsequent years suggested that much larger warships were necessary to function effectively in 
these conditions. A small patrol vessel with a displacement of approximately two thousand tons 
would start to lose its effectiveness in Sea State 4 with significant decline once it reached Sea 
State 5.268 Comparatively, a warship with a displacement of four thousand tons would also start 
to lose effectiveness in the same conditions; albeit, the decline would be less drastic because of 
the greater stability of the larger hull.  
These findings were confirmed by the Future Ship Study conducted by the CMDO in 
1980. Its examination of the authoritative Jane’s Fighting Ship (1979-80 edition) revealed that 
most nations believed that a warship in the 3500-4200-ton range to be minimal size necessary for 
the protection of their SLOC based on the vessels which were built or acquired by major navies 
during the 1970s.269 The study also reinforced the argument that a large and well-armed warship 
was the only vessel which met all of Canada’s operational requirements. A vessel which lacked 
self-defence capabilities against aerial, surface or subsurface threats would be a liability rather 
than an asset as it would distract other ships in the task force from completing their primary 
mission.270 Furthermore, warships with only a short-range self-defence capability would be of 
limited use unless it was perfectly positioned between the attacker and its target. In contrast, a 
warship with a long-range weapons capability would not only be able to provide sufficient 
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protection for other vessels, but also offered a degree of deterrence that less capable ships could 
not.271  
The differences in capabilities between a sovereignty patrol ship and a modern warship 
were significant. The former was limited to operations in Canadian waters or areas of low risk of 
hostile activity due to its lack of offensive and defensive capabilities. This meant that a 
sovereignty patrol vessel could not participate in NATO operations nor could it contribute to the 
overall deterrence capability of the alliance. 272 In contrast, a patrol frigate, whose minimum 
requirements exceeded those of the patrol vessel, was capable of completing both the sovereignty 
patrols tasked by the government as well as Canada’s NATO responsibilities. It would have the 
range and endurance to operate far from its base, and carry the sensors, electronic systems and 
weaponry to operate in nearly all theatres and to perform a multitude of roles.  
In September 1977, Cabinet finally accepted the argument that warships had the 
flexibility to conduct both NATO and sovereignty responsibilities while dedicated patrol vessels 
could not.273 The cost difference between the two designs was another factor which helped to 
convince Cabinet to procure patrol frigates. A sovereignty patrol vessel which met Canada’s 
requirements was estimated to cost about $93 million per ship; in contrast, a surface combatant 
would have cost approximately $139 million each (both in 1977 figures).274 Given the relatively 
minor difference in cost but the large gap in capabilities, it was apparent that the acquisition of a 
 
271 Nigel Brodeur, “Warships Options for Canada – Excerpt from Future Ship Study,” (1980), 1. Acquired from 
Nigel Brodeur. 
272 “Annex B – Considerations of Smaller Ships for Sovereignty Purpose of Maritime Forces Surface Requirements 
(DND-8-77DP),” Vol 74 File 1, 97, Barney Danson Fonds, R13905-1415-0-E, LAC. 
273 Peter Haydon. “From Uncertainty to Maturity, 1968-1979” in The Naval Service of Canada, 1910-2010. Edited 
by Rich Gimblett, (Toronto: Dundurn Books 2009), 173.  
274 “Discussion Paper – Maritime Forces Surface Requirements (DND-8-77DP),” Vol 74, File 11, 97, Barney 
Danson Fonds, R13905-1415-0-E, LAC. 
Ma 101 
 
 
 
warship would be the most cost-effective means for MARCOM to fulfill its responsibilities. The 
name, the Canadian Patrol Frigates, reflected the dual functions of Canada’s newest warship.  
Chapter 4.4 – The CPF Procurement Strategy 
On December 22, 1977, the Pierre Trudeau government announced its decision to procure 
six new warships, termed the Canadian Patrol Frigates for MARCOM. The government chose to 
designate the new warships as frigates because they were designed for a specific mission profile, 
which in this case was anti-submarine warfare. In comparison, a destroyer was considered to be 
more of a general-purpose warship which also possessed a significant anti-air capability.275 
Furthermore, the CPFs lacked the C3 (Command, Control and Communication) suite found on 
the DDH-280 destroyers. Nevertheless, they were to be massive warships as at a length of 134m 
with a displacement of 4200t, it would be larger than many World War I-era light cruisers and 
were of comparable size to the DDH-280 destroyers.276 The procurement of the CPFs was a 
landmark event in Canadian military history as this was the first naval procurement program 
since the end of the Second World War that was not designed and managed by the Canadian 
navy. Instead, the domestic shipbuilding industry took on the lead role in the design, system 
integration and construction of Canada’s latest warships. 
The new procurement strategy was introduced in response to the experience of the DDH-
280 programs and other navy-major procurement projects.277 In previous DND-directed 
shipbuilding programs, significant cost overruns and delays were incurred because they operated 
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on a “cost-plus” basis. The initial funding request was only for the base ship which was designed 
by the Director General Maritime Engineering and Maintenance (DGMEM) and his staff. DND 
officials would then return to Cabinet at later dates to request additional funds in order to bring 
the ship to operational standards.278 In addition to being the customer, MARCOM also 
functioned as the architects for the ships and was responsible for the acquisition of key 
components such as weapons, electronic systems, and software packages which were supplied to 
the shipbuilders for construction and integration. This allowed the navy to make unlimited 
modifications to the designs in pursuit of the best ship to meet the service’s operational 
requirements.279 Although the final products were technological marvels and top-of-the-line 
warships, there were large financial over-runs, delays in completion, and thus political costs. In 
the case of the DDH-280 destroyers, which was the final major naval procurement program 
undertaken by DND officials, they were not fully operational until four years after they were 
delivered.280  
The experiences of the General-Purpose Frigate program, HMCS Bonaventure refit and 
DDH 280 destroyer program led to very little trust in the ability of the navy to manage another 
major procurement program.281 The sentiment echoed by major stakeholders such as Cabinet, 
and the Treasury Board, was “no more till you convince us you can procure equipment without 
delays, cost overruns & embarrassing us.”282 As such, a new procurement strategy was adopted 
for the CPF project and incorporated a number of new key features to ensure the failures of the 
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past did not resurface. The project was divided into two phases: Project Definition (PD) and 
Project Implementation (PI). 283  
One of the major problems which plagued past procurement programs was that the 
project requirements were not explicitly defined. John Shepard, who was the project manager for 
both the Protecteur-class AOR ships and the CPF program at Saint John Shipbuilding (SJSDD) 
recalled that the former suffered from a lack of clarity on what the navy wanted which resulted in 
significant delays as the two sides negotiated a compromise to the technical problems. The CPF 
project had no such problems as the contract and stated requirements left no room for 
misunderstanding.284 This was the result of a thorough project definition stage undertaken by the 
CPF Project Management Office.  
When Barney Danson submitted DND’s memo to cabinet in 1977 on the Ship 
Replacement Program, he requested $63M to conduct a Project Definition competition for the 
project. The purpose of the competition was to identify two potential contractors who would 
proceed to the Contract Definition stage, where $20 million would be provided to each to 
develop not only the final ship designs but the total support package necessary to operate and 
sustain the vessels through their life cycles. This was known as “Total Package Procurement” 
and entailed all the supporting infrastructure such as training facilities and manuals to be 
included without additional capital expenditure in addition to the delivery of six fully operational 
ships.285 Some of the key deliverables which the Prime Contractor was responsible for included a 
Personnel Training Facility, a Gunnery Support Facility, a Propulsion Training Centre and a 
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Combat Systems Training Centre.286 As life cycle and support costs made up half of the project 
cost, it was imperative that post-delivery expenditures were accounted for to avoid the very large 
increments in costs of past projects. The implementation of the CPF procurement strategy 
undoubtedly made the process far more challenging for the potential Prime Contractor. 
Nevertheless, it helped DND to present a fully costed, defined and supported proposal to Cabinet 
and ensured that the cost of the CPFs would be within the stated budget.  
Pierre Trudeau, as well as several other cabinet ministers, questioned the need to spend 
such a large amount of money for this purpose.287 Romeo LeBlanc, the Minister of Fisheries and 
Environment, was displeased by the request as Cabinet had previously said that it did not have 
$1 million to spare for the construction of small ships to alleviate unemployment in the Atlantic 
provinces.288 Minister Danson replied that it was necessary to ensure the project proceeded 
without the costly delays and cost overruns which plagued past programs.289 Modern warships 
are extremely complex vehicles, consisting of over two hundred major and two thousand minor 
systems which must be operational and effective over the course of its 25-year operational life.290 
Furthermore, the CPF project was conducted at the same time as the New Fighter Project which 
meant that the cashflow of DND was extremely limited and overruns in either programs would 
affect the other as well, thus necessitating the need for a fully costed proposal.  
A second notable aspect of the new procurement strategy was that the Prime Contractor 
would assume Total Systems Responsibility for the project. The concept of Total Systems 
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Responsibility meant that the contractor, instead of the government, would assume responsibility 
for all aspects of the project from design, systems selection, project schedule and cost.291 Due to 
the complexity in the design and integration of systems aboard a modern warship, it would not 
be possible to modify or exchange systems once the design had been finalized. This would 
prevent the past practice where naval design staffs were constantly making changes to the ship 
design even after construction began to incorporate new equipment and capabilities. In order to 
give the Canadian industry the greatest freedom to develop its proposal, the project operated 
under a Design to Cost principle. In practice, this meant that interested parties were only given 
minimum parameters for their proposals such as the project budget, the number of ships to be 
acquired and the basic capabilities desired from the vessels.292  
The Request for Proposals (RFP) were issued to the Canadian industry in August 1978 
and asked interested contractors to submit two proposals: one for Source Qualification and other 
for Contract Definition. The former required the contractor to detail its methods of meeting the 
government’s technical, management, industrial benefits, contractual and costing requirements of 
the project. The latter asked them to outline how it would approach the competitive Contract 
Definition (CD) phase which would be used to develop comprehensive proposals for the ship 
system design, production, quality assurance, product support, program management and 
Canadian industrial benefit.293 It also provided bidders with three options for source 
qualification: 1) Procuring the ship entirely offshore; 2) Acquire a foreign design to build in 
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Canada; 3) have the Canadian industry design and build the ships under DND’s direction.294 A 
fourth option, whereby DND officials would design the ships in partnership with the domestic 
industry and then build them in Canada, was not included in the final RFP because the 
degradation of DND’s design and project management capability, which was a result of the 
manpower reductions from earlier in the decade meant that the defence department only 
possessed a minimal capability to administer such a program. It also did not align with the 
Government’s desire to use the program to stimulate the growth of critical managerial and design 
skills in the Canadian shipbuilding industry necessary for its revitalization and long-term 
sustainability.  
Five parties expressed initial interest and responded to the RFP. They were Genstar 
Marine Ltd, Pratt and Whitney Aircraft of Canada, a consortium led by Litton Systems with 
Davie Shipyard and Canadian Vickers, a consortium led by Sperry Rand Canada with Saint John 
Shipbuilding and Drydocks and Marine Industries Ltd and lastly, a consortium led by Canada 
Steamships Line Ltd. in conjunction with the Italian shipbuilder Cantieri Navali del Tirreno 
Riuniti.295 In August 1981, this was whittled down to two finalists, a consortium led by Saint 
John Shipbuilding, and the other led by SCAN Marine. As illustrated in the next chapter, the 
selection of the finalists for the project was fraught with political interference and as a result, the 
victor of the CPF competition would not be announced until June 1983.  
 
 
 
294 Department of Supplies and Services Canada, “Request for Proposal for Canadian Patrol Frigate,” Vol 74, File 
12, 7, Barney Danson Fonds, R13905-1372-8-E, LAC. 
295 “Five bidders compete to build navy frigates.” Globe and Mail (August 2, 1978): B3 
Ma 107 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 – A Vessel of Politics: Political Considerations and the 
Procurement of the CPFs 
“The procurement of military weapons and equipment in Canada has often been controlled by partisan 
political considerations – not by a clear desire to increase the capability of the military.”296 – Aaron 
Plamondon 
In February 1982, Vice Admiral Andrew Fulton, the commander of MARCOM invited 
the prime minister and his children to visit the fleet in Halifax. Over the course of two days, the 
group participated in a tour of both the HMCS Iroquois and HMCS Okanagan. As the excursion 
came to its end, Pierre Trudeau invited the admiral to meet with him the next time he was in 
Ottawa. Several months passed before Vice Admiral Fulton met with the prime minister to 
present a photo album from the excursion. At the end of the meeting as Trudeau ushered Fulton 
to the door, he said “Admiral, you will get your ships.”297 This anecdote, while lighthearted, was 
the cumulation of many years of work by defence officials leading to the procurement of the 
Canadian Patrol Frigates. Previous chapters detailed the demise of Canada’s navy in the 1960s, 
the chaos of Pierre Trudeau’s early years as prime minister and the new strategic landscape 
which navy officials faced as they defined the requirements of Canada’s latest warships. The 
final aspect which has yet to be examined was the reason why the Trudeau government approved 
the project. This chapter will illustrate that although the decision to procure the Canadian Patrol 
Frigates was rooted in clear military needs, it was driven by political considerations. 
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One of the overlooked aspects of Defence in the 70s was the use of the Canadian Armed 
Forces to produce socio-economic benefits for the country.298 The procurement of equipment for 
the military had long been used by the government as a tool for economic growth, but the 
importance of industrial and regional benefits (IRB) increased significantly more under Trudeau. 
Notably, even as the rest of his foreign and defence policy fluctuated between 1969 to 1975, 
Trudeau’s commitment to use the military for the betterment of Canada remained steadfast.  
He was even willing to consider the procurement of new aircraft and warships. However, this 
was always done under the context of promoting economic growth and not to increase the 
capabilities of its armed forces.299  
When the defence minister Barney Danson announced the government’s decision to 
acquire six frigates in December 1977, he stated that “… we have directed that the shipbuilding 
program optimise the fullest utilisation of Canadian industrial capability. There is, in Canada, a 
large number of firms engaged in the design and manufacture of mechanical and electronic 
systems for ships. Such firms in concert with Canadian shipyards and ship design agencies could 
provide the expertise required for the design and production phase of this shipbuilding 
program.”300 This point would be emphasized by members of Trudeau’s cabinet throughout the 
project. 
On June 29, 1983, when the victor of the competition for the CPF program was 
announced, Danson’s successor, Gilles Lamontagne stated that “As the naval modernization 
program continues, hand in glove with the continuing modernization of Canadian industry, it is 
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essential that the vital skills required are developed in a number of centres of excellence. Our 
overall maritime re-equipment program is therefore designed to develop and maintain modern 
capabilities and skills across Canada.”301 Jean-Jacque Blais, the Minister of Supply and Services 
(MSS) whose statement followed Lamontagne’s, emphasized the fact that the project would 
create thirty thousand person-years of employment and that two-thirds of the project would be 
fulfilled by domestic firms.302 This point was further reinforced by Charles Lapointe, who had 
recently succeeded Blais as the MSS, on August 18, 1983 at the signing of the contract for the 
CPFs in Saint John.303 As this chapter will demonstrate, the design of the CPF project was 
heavily shaped by political considerations in order to maximize industrial development 
objectives that would be favourable to the government.  
Chapter 5.1 – The Development of Canada’s Indigenous Electronics Industry 
The Trudeau government was eager to make use of the opportunity presented by the 
procurement of the Canadian Patrol Frigates to further the development of domestic industries. 
Modern warships are a collection of highly complex electronic and mechanical systems which 
requires numerous specialized technologies and capabilities to construct. The CPFs, which 
contained two hundred major electronic systems and two thousand minor subsystems were 
regarded as the perfect vessel to achieve this goal. One of the sectors which the government 
sought to expand was its indigenous electronics industry, as electronic systems was one of the 
fastest growing industries in the world with special emphasis placed on the creation of a systems 
integration capability. In 1977, the global industry was valued at $100 billion, 10 percent of 
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which was from computer-based electronic systems alone.304 In Canada, this subsector grew by 
26 percent from the previous year.305 The development of an electronic systems integration 
capability was of particular interest to the government not only because of its industrial and 
economic potential to create well-paying jobs but also because of its application in a number of 
secondary fields such as energy management, communications, and defence. However, growth in 
this field was dependent not on the amount of investment into production capability but on the 
continued accrual of knowledge and experience.306 
The Minister of State for Science and Technology (MOSST) Judd Buchanan was 
especially keen to use the Canadian Patrol Frigate program to promote the development of the 
indigenous electronics industry. In 1978, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce 
identified the lack of a systems integration capability as one of the two major inhibitors in the 
growth of the fledging Canadian electronics industry. The other was domination of the field by 
foreign owned companies.307 Due to the wide-ranging application and the sensitive nature of 
these technologies, there were already increasingly stringent restrictions on the export of these 
goods and capabilities by the countries of origin. If Canada was to maintain its status as a global 
leader in high technology, it was imperative that it devised the means to produce the required 
capabilities domestically which could not occur without positive government intervention.308  
 During the formulation of the Request for Proposal for the CPF project in 1978, 
Buchanan and Jack Horner, the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, submitted a series of 
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memos to Cabinet to press for stronger language on the requirement for a Canadian-controlled 
firm to undertake the electronic systems integration aboard the Canadian Patrol Frigates. 
Systems integration was a key component of the project which made up nearly half of the project 
cost.309 Buchanan acknowledged that an explicit demand for the systems integration to be 
completed by a Canadian-controlled company would lead to increased costs and decreased 
competition for the CPF program. However, he contended that the potential economic and 
industrial benefits were more than enough to justify the increased expenditure.310 Furthermore, 
while systems integration was a vital component of the warships and failures by the contractor 
could derail the entire project, he believed that there were sufficient competencies within the 
Canadian electronics industry to meet the demands of the CPFs.311  
DND, and to a lesser extent, DSS were opposed to the requirement that a Canadian-
controlled firm be responsible for the electronic systems integrations for the CPFs. C.R. Nixon, 
the long-time Deputy Minister of National Defence had significant reservations about the use of 
the CPF program as a vehicle for the development of a Canadian systems integration capability 
and for other high technology purposes because it offered no guarantees that the industries 
created through the project would be sustainable without continued government intervention.312 
Furthermore, it would have significant implications for the management of the CPF project. The 
requirement not only added another level of constraints to an already complex shipbuilding 
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program, but it also inhibited proposals based on foreign designs which in turn affected the 
competitive nature of the project and the ability for DND/DSS to procure a warship that met all 
the operational requirements at the lowest possible price.313 Such a ban in foreign participation 
on the systems integration aspect of the project could potentially trigger international 
repercussions.314  
Rear Admiral Jock Allen, the Associate ADM (Mat) concurred with Nixon and argued 
that such a Canadian content requirement went against the principle idea of letting the 
shipbuilding industry come up with the best designs and procurement strategy. It would have a 
significant impact on the formation of industry consortia as it would effectively force 
shipbuilders to collaborate with firms that had little experience in systems integration because of 
a government directive and would result in considerable unnecessary risks to the project. 315 Rear 
Admiral Allen recommended that if such a provision was to be mandated, it would be better to 
forego the RFP and instead to opt for a “DND-controlled engineering design and project 
control.”316 Cabinet was unswayed by the objections posed by DND officials, with ministers 
agreeing that the integration of at least two of the major electronic systems must be completed by 
a Canadian-controlled firm.317 The requirement for a Canadian-based company to be responsible 
for the integration of major electronic systems over the objection of defence officials, was a clear 
example of how government political interests superseded those of the military.  
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Chapter 5.2 – The Revival of Canada’s Shipbuilding Industry 
Canada remains one of a select few nations that does not have a national shipyard system 
and instead relies on public-private programs for the construction of its warships. This means 
that the government acts as both a client and a patron of the shipbuilding industry.318 Since the 
Second World War, the Canadian government had slowly nurtured an indigenous industry to 
ensure that its shipbuilding and maintenance needs were met. The RCN, in particular was eager 
to maintain a strong industry which could be quickly mobilized in times of emergencies. The 
massive shipbuilding program which took place after the Korean War epitomized this 
partnership. However, this arrangement also led the industry to be reliant on the Government for 
new contracts. Historically, the domestic shipbuilding industry subsisted largely on Government 
contracts as well as domestic commercial cargo vessels and fishing trawlers.319 The Robertson 
Report commissioned by the Canadian Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Association (CSSRA) in 
1970 stated that new construction work made up 50-60 percent of a shipyard’s work between 
1958-69. DND’s share of new construction ranged from 2 to 32 percent during this period with 
an annual average of 18 percent.320 Therefore, while naval constructions alone were insufficient 
to sustain the industry, it nevertheless represented an important source of revenue for the 
industry. With the commissioning of the final DDH-280 destroyer in 1973, the construction of 
warships in Canada ceased. 
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The decline of the Canadian shipbuilding industry was the result of several factors, one of 
which was the lack of new military contracts due to fiscal austerity measures imposed on the 
Canadian Forces by the Pierre Trudeau government. The shortfall in funding, as explored in 
Chapter Three had been a persistent problem for the Canadian military that disproportionally 
affected MARCOM. Ideally, capital investment should make up half of MARCOM’s budget to 
ensure that its equipment was modern and operationally effective. However, this level was never 
reached as the services prioritized its operational needs first amidst the many budget cuts during 
the 1960s and the procurement of new warships became a luxury rather than a requirement. The 
capital equipment budget averaged only 25 percent of total naval expenditure for much of the 
decade. Under Trudeau, MARCOM’s budget for capital equipment funding fell to dangerously 
low levels. In FY1969-70, MARCOM’s capital expenditure made up 26 percent of the navy’s 
budget on account of the ongoing procurement of the DDH 280s and the Protecteur-class AOR 
ships. 321 By FY1975-76, this dropped to 9 percent, as inflation caused personnel and operating 
costs to soar.322  
Globally, shipbuilding was a highly competitive but largely unprofitable enterprise. Most 
shipbuilders were dependent on government subsidies and protectionist measures such as tariffs 
or import restrictions to remain competitive and viable. From 1971 to 1975, there was a surge in 
demand for new commercial cargo vessels and 70 percent of all tonnage construction in 1974 – 
1976 in Canada was marked for export.323 The 1973 Oil Crisis, mentioned in Chapter Three as 
the catalyst for the 1975 Defence Structure Review, led a large number of businesses to 
 
321 Annex A - Figure 2: RCN/MARCOM Expenditure 1961/62 to 1983/84. 
322 Ibid.  
323 Jack Horner, “Discussion Paper - The Canadian Shipbuilding and Repair Industry (ITC-18-77-DP),” (October 5, 
1977), Vol 75 File 17, 1, Barney Danson Fonds, R13905-1396-0-E, LAC. 
Ma 115 
 
 
 
reconsider their shipping needs.324 This in turn resulted in a drastic reduction in new orders while 
numerous existing orders were cancelled. Competition for the few available contracts became 
fierce and the Canadian shipbuilding industry suffered immensely. Shipbuilding was a labour-
intensive industry and the high cost of labour made Canadian shipyards uncompetitive on the 
global stage. The labour cost of a ship built in Canada could cost up to $20 per man-hour 
compared to $2 to $3 in a shipyard in South Korea.325 As such, even the 25 percent tariff on 
imported vessels and a 20 percent subsidy to Canadian shipbuilders was insufficient to compete 
with foreign competitors.  
In most countries, government subsidies covered over 30 percent of production costs in 
order to attract contracts for their national shipyards. In Canada, this was initially set at 50 and 
40 percent for trawlers and commercial vessels respectively during the early 1960s.326 However, 
as the argument that a strong domestic shipbuilding industry was necessary for national security 
reasons lost political appeal, these subsidies were reduced significantly. The Shipbuilding 
Industry Assistance Program (SIAP) introduced by the Trudeau government in 1975, provided 
only a 14 percent subsidy for orders placed that year. The value of the subsidy was planned to 
decrease by 1 percent annually until it reached 12 percent in 1977. However, in March 1977, it 
was raised to 20 percent in an emergency measure to prevent the mass layoff of workers as a 
large number of orders were completed concurrently at multiple shipyards.327  
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Studies by DOI suggested that to maintain the level of employment at fourteen thousand 
workers, the industry would require a minimum of $350 million annually in new orders. The $70 
million subsidy provided by SIAP reduced the requirement to $280 million which allowed the 
government to stave off the collapse of the industry and prevent the loss of thousands of 
positions. Nevertheless, the outlook remained bleak. As the Project Definition phase of the CPF 
program took place, the industry subsisted on lesser orders such as oil rigs and small vessels. By 
June 1983, when the Prime Contractor for the CPF project was announced, the situation was 
critical as only two shipyards had any construction work scheduled for beyond November of that 
year.328 The collapse of Canada’s shipbuilding industry led Vice Admiral (ret’d) J.C. O’Brien to 
lament “I see our navy being starved to death because Canada has abdicated its responsibility of 
maintaining a self-sufficient industrial base from which to produce the necessary equipment.”329  
Admittedly, the Canadian shipbuilding industry was a relatively minor contributor to the 
economy, accounting for 0.2 percent of the GNP.330 In 1976, the industry employed 
approximately fifteen thousand people which amounted to just 1 percent of all construction 
positions in Canada.331 While it supported an additional forty-five hundred positions through its 
supply chains, it was hardly a core industry which the government should devote resources to 
sustain. However, from a public policy perspective, the survival of the Canadian shipbuilding 
industry was vital for both national security and political reasons. DND relied heavily on civilian 
shipyards to assist in ship refits and repairs, as its own facilities were unable to keep up with 
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demand.332 Despite such needs, it was ultimately political considerations that made the need to 
keep the domestic industry afloat a necessity. 
The shipbuilding industry had a disproportionate impact on several regions. Many of the 
major Canadian shipyards were located in the Maritime Provinces, Quebec and British Columbia 
in communities which otherwise had few other well-paying alternatives.333 The unemployment 
rate in the Maritime Provinces, Quebec and British Columbia ranged from 7 to 12 percent and 
the collapse of the shipbuilding industry would have caused a significant ripple effect. 334 There 
were also wider economic consequences as shipyards supported many secondary industries, most 
notably the steel industry centered around Hamilton and the Niagara Peninsula. Pierre Trudeau’s 
return to power in 1980 was largely based on the strong showing of the party in these regions 
which created a need to create economic benefits in exchange for continued political support.  
The decline of the Canadian shipbuilding industry had significant impact on the CPF 
program. It was common practice in the industry to lay off workers between shipbuilding 
projects. Furthermore, unlike other nations, senior staff members and technicians were not 
retained, leaving the shipyards to deteriorate after each project. 335 This meant that each time a 
shipbuilding program was initiated, significant time and expenditure were required to rebuild 
expertise and refurbish the physical plant. The large gaps between the various naval shipbuilding 
programs of the 1950s and 60s, the DDH 280 destroyers, and the CPFs meant that a substantial 
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amount of talent was lost during the intervening years. The degradation of these essential 
capabilities and infrastructure was what prompted the Minister Judd Buchanan to argue that it 
was inconceivable for DND and the Canadian shipbuilding industry to carry out such a project in 
1977.336  
The prolonged depressed state of the shipbuilding industry also meant significant 
investments and time were necessary to prepare the shipyards for the construction of the CPFs. 
Due to a dearth of contracts for traditional commercial and government ships between 1977 to 
1983, most of Canada’s major shipyards had been reconfigured for the construction of oil rigs 
and small support vessels. As such, significant retooling was necessary to reconfigure the chosen 
shipyard to construct a large warship such as the CPF. Government studies predicted that based 
on the economic conditions and sustained demands from the energy sector, the earliest that 
construction could commence in a Canadian shipyard would be 1985 even if the CPF contract 
was to be awarded in 1983.337 The Trudeau government willingly accepted this delay as it 
ensured that the warships would be designed and built within Canada.338  
Chapter 5.3 – The CPF Bid Evaluation 
 On August 15, 1981, Jean-Jacques Blais, the Minister of Supplies and Services, 
announced that Scan Marine (SCAN) based in Montreal, QC and Saint John Shipbuilding 
(SJSDD) from Saint John, NB as the two finalists who would proceed to the Contract Definition 
Stage of the CPF Program. The selection of the two consortia was not without significant 
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political drama. In 1979, the CPF PMO recommended the selection of the consortia led by Litton 
and Sperry to proceed to the Contract Definition Stage. However, this plan went awry with the 
defeat of the Joe Clark government in March 1980. When Pierre Trudeau and the Liberal Party 
returned to power, the new Minister of Supply and Services, Jean-Jacques Blais notified the five 
contenders for the CPF project that they were insufficiently Canadian and would be given one 
month to adjust their bids to comply with the new requirements.339  
Several of the leading contenders for the project, Sperry, Litton and Pratt & Whitney, 
made significant changes to remain in the process. Litton turned over the Prime Contractor 
position to its partnered shipyard, Canadian Vickers from Montreal.340 Pratt & Whitney, who did 
not partner with any Canadian shipyard instead created a company, 99299 Quebec LTE, which 
later became Scan Marine, to become its candidate for Prime Contractor position. Lastly, Sperry 
made a similar change to its proposal with its major subcontractor, Saint John Shipbuilding who 
became the lead in its proposal.341 Furthermore, Sperry created a wholly owned subsidiary, 
Paramax Electronics, to be responsible for the integration of electronic systems in order to 
strengthen the Canadian content of its proposal. As the PMO prepared to resubmit its 
recommendations, a lobbyist for Pratt & Whitney contended that the bid by Vickers should be 
disqualified due to a conflict of interest as Vickers-Stanwyck, a partially-owned subsidiary of 
Canadian Vickers, had hired T.A. Arnott, the first project manager of the CPF program as its 
new president. Though his employment had been approved by the government’s conflict of 
interest office, Trudeau’s cabinet made it clear that it would not approve of Vickers’ 
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involvement. 342 As a result, SCAN replaced Vickers as one of the finalists to participate in the 
final phase of the competition for the CPFs.  
During the Contract Definition stage, which took place over the course of fifteen months, 
the two-finalist consortia each received $20 million to develop not just the final designs of the 
warship but also detailed management plans, industrial benefits distribution proposals and 
lifecycle support arrangements. To ensure the transfer of critical design and managerial skills 
from DND to the shipbuilding firms, the Contract Definition stage operated under a “negative 
guidance” basis whereby the PMO would comment and advise the shipbuilders on problems in 
their submissions but would not provide solutions to them. In practice, DND officials would 
reject a concept or proposal without explanation or how to fix it to their liking, much to the 
displeasure of the shipyards’ design staffs.343 The final submissions were due on October 2, 1982 
which was then assessed by a committee from DND, DSS, DOI and other relevant government 
departments. Notably, the PMO, recognizing the inherently biased nature of the office chose to 
abstain from the evaluation process and instead relied on naval officers not associated with the 
project to conduct the evaluation of the technical elements of the bids.344 
The bids from SCAN and SJSDD were assessed based on their compliance with the 
project and government requirements, the risks involved in their proposal, and the ability of the 
consortium to undertake the project.345 The specific areas in which the bids were evaluated were: 
the operational capability of the proposed warship, the ship design, the integrated logistics plan, 
the industrial benefits distribution plan, the financial soundness of the bidding consortium and 
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the management plan and team.346 In nearly every aspect evaluated, SJSDD’s bid was equal to or 
superior compared to those of its competitor. SJSDD’s bid was especially strong in two key 
determinants: overall project risk and cost.347  
The risk management factor was one of critical concerns of the CPF PMO. As previously 
mentioned in Chapter 4.4, the confidence of Cabinet, other government departments and the 
public in DND’s ability to manage major procurement programs was already exceedingly low. 
The Trudeau government had already witnessed the cost overruns in the HMCS Bonaventure 
refit and the acquisition of the CP-140 Aurora LRPA turn into political embarrassments under 
their watch; a third failed project would only cement DND’s legacy of failures with devastating 
consequences for MARCOM. Both SCAN and SJSDD were mandated as part of their bids to 
make arrangements for large and comprehensive insurance policies which would cover the ships 
against all risks until their delivery; this ensured that the Government would be financially 
compensated if the program went awry.348 However, no such guarantees were available to the 
navy if the ships failed to be delivered.  
The bulk of Canada’s surface warships – all but the four DDH 280s -- were near the end 
of their expected life. Not only were the destroyers operationally obsolete but both operating and 
maintenance costs had spiralled due to the advanced age of the vessels as well as the lack of 
readily available spare parts. Comprehensive Destroyer Life Extension (DELEX) refits, which 
started with the original St.-Laurent class destroyers in the late 1970s, extended the life of the 
destroyers by another decade. These refits were largely a desperation measure to extend the life 
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of vessels that were now more than twenty years old until the CPFs could enter service.349 In the 
event the CPF project collapsed, a new shipbuilding program would have to be initiated thereby 
further delaying the delivery of MARCOM’s latest warships by several more years. In such a 
scenario, the impact on the operational capability of MARCOM would be disastrous, and for this 
reason, the risk assessment was a critical factor in the bid evaluation.  
The difference in the risks associated with SJSDD and SCAN’s proposals were glaring as 
illustrated in Annex B. Nearly every aspect of SCAN’s bid were judged to be of high risk with 
only the projected operational capability of the ships and the integrated logistics plan considered 
to be of medium risk. In contrast, SJSDD’s proposal was rated to be of significantly lower risk 
with several elements (ship design and integrated logistics plan) deemed to be of low risk.350 
Furthermore, not only was SJSDD’s bid considered to be of lower risk but it would provide the 
warships at a significantly lower cost. 
The CPF project operated under a two-tier pricing system. The target price was the price 
which the Prime Contractor would strive to keep while the ceiling price acted as a hard cap for 
the project. A reward system was established based on the final cost of the project.351 If the cost 
of the project was below the target price, the prime contractor would receive 20 percent of the 
savings under the target price as a bonus. Conversely, 20 percent of the overage would be 
deducted as a penalty if the target price was exceeded. Lastly, if the final cost exceeded the 
ceiling price, the contractor would receive no profit.352 SCAN Marine’s final proposal called for 
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a target price of $5.791 billion and a ceiling price of $6.062 billion. By contrast, SJSDD’s target 
price was $4.702 billion with a ceiling price of $5.373 billion.353 The difference between the two 
offers was nearly $1 billion at the target price and $671 million at the ceiling price. 
As part of the submissions for the CPF contract, SCAN and SJSDD were both asked to 
detail the cost and industrial benefit breakdown for alternative construction arrangements. Both 
bidders presented three possible construction options for the CPF PMO’s consideration: (1) to 
build all six ships in a single shipyard, (2) three ships each in the Atlantic Provinces and Quebec, 
and lastly, (3) two ships each in shipyards located in the Atlantic provinces, Quebec and British 
Columbia.354 From a project management perspective, there were no significant advantages to be 
gained from choosing either Options Two or Three other than to more equally distribute 
industrial and regional benefits (IRB). Not only would the government have to pay a significant 
construction premium, it would introduce unnecessary management burdens and risks as more 
parties became involved in the project.355 However, their inclusion demonstrated that the 
distribution of IRBs was a top priority for Cabinet.  
The distribution of industrial and regional benefits among the four primary Canadian 
regions was the most contentious issue in the CPF program because it was largely political in 
nature.356 Given the immense monetary value and the socio-industrial potential of the project, it 
should be of no surprise that the CPF commanded significant political attention. One senior 
official involved in the project recalled that he would receive numerous phone calls or meeting 
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requests from Member of Parliaments eager to have their constituents participate in the 
project.357 The project was designed to provide maximum industrial benefits for Canadian 
businesses and as such, at least 65 percent of contents in the ships had to be Canadian. 358 
Furthermore, if components needed to be acquired from a foreign source, the value of those parts 
would have to be offset by creating economic benefits of equal value within Canada. Another 
requirement of the CPF project was that the economic benefits generated from the project must 
equal to 100 percent of the project cost.359 After it had won the competition, SJSDD committed 
to offset the $700 million worth of equipment and supplies it would acquire from abroad with 
additional Canadian contents and services.  
The only advantage that SCAN held over SJSDD was in the value of its proposed IRB 
package. SCAN’s bid proposed to generate $2.535 billion in industrial benefits compared to 
$2.373 billion for SJSDD. However, it heavily favoured Quebec where SCAN was based and 
where much of the design, construction and systems integration would occur. The IRB 
distribution of its single shipyard option by region was as follow: $1.569 billion for Quebec, 
$149 million for the Atlantic provinces, $669 million for Ontario and $148 million for the 
Western provinces. In contrast, SJSDD’s proposal was much more balanced: $710 million for 
Quebec, $887 million for the Atlantic provinces, $695 million for Ontario and $91 million for 
the Western provinces. The IRB breakdown for the two-and-three-shipyard options for both 
consortia can be found in Annex D. 360 SJSDD’s bid was assessed to not only be significantly 
cheaper than SCAN whilst being far less risky, it would provide more evenly distributed benefits 
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358 “Briefing for the Honourable Romeo LeBlanc.” (June 20, 1983). Vol 213 File 1, Romeo LeBlanc Fonds, 
R12069-3185-4-E, LAC. 
359 Williams. Reinventing Canadian Defence Procurement, 64. 
360 Annex D - Construction Options and IRB Distributions.  
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under its IRB proposal. On June 29, 1983, defence minister Gilles Lamontagne, announced 
SJSDD as the victor of the CPF competition and that construction of the warships would be split 
between shipyards in Saint John and in Quebec.361 
DND officials had noted that while the decision to select SJSDD as the Prime Contractor 
and to build all the ships in Saint John would be the most cost-effective and least risky option, it 
would inevitably lead to significant backlash from Quebec as the difference in industrial benefits 
were enormous.362 SCAN’s single shipyard option would have produced $1.198 billion in IRB 
for Quebec compared to just $640 million in SJSDD’s proposal. The resulting $558 million 
shortfall in industrial benefits for Quebec was deemed to be politically unacceptable for reasons 
which will be discussed later. However, as SCAN’s proposal cost $709 million more than 
SJSDD’s, it was not a viable alternative and attention then turned to the two-shipyard option. 
Saint John Shipbuilding’s two-shipyard option would have seen half of the frigates built in its 
own drydock in Saint John, NB whilst the other three would be subcontracted to a Quebec-based 
shipyard. The arrangement would entail a $57 million construction premium. However, it would 
also largely bridge the IRB difference between the competitors to a mere $83 million, a price that 
the government was more than willing to pay. 363 The decision to split the construction of the 
vessels between two different shipyards despite the added premiums and additional risks it posed 
to the project once again demonstrated that political considerations were the foremost concern to 
Cabinet during the CPF project.  
 
361 Gilles Lamontagne, “Statement announcing the awarding of the CPF project,” (June 29, 1983), Vol 213 File 1, 1, 
Romeo LeBlanc Fonds, R12069-3185-4-E, LAC. 
362 “Canadian Patrol Frigate, Supplement to Memo to Cabinet (256-83MC),” (May 11, 1983), Vol 213, File 1, 1, 
Romeo LeBlanc Fonds, R12069-3185-4-E, LAC. 
363 M.C. Nelson, “Aide-Memoire for the Minister - Possible Socio-Economic Benefits for Saint John, N.B. if the 
Implementation Contract for the Canadian Patrol Frigates Program is awarded to a local company,” Vol 213, File 1, 
3, Romeo LeBlanc Fonds, R12069-3185-4-E, LAC. 
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Chapter 5.4 – The Quebec Caucus Crisis 
 Trudeau’s return to power in the 1980 was largely due to gains in Ontario and the 
Atlantic provinces, but it was support in Quebec, long the bedrock for the Liberal Party, which 
made victory possible. Between 1965 and 1980, the party won no less than fifty-six seats in the 
province during federal elections.364 The significance of Quebec to Trudeau was more than just 
its importance to the stability of his government or the fact that he was born there. Pierre 
Trudeau was a fervent federalist who was determined to keep the province a part of Canada.365 
Despite the defeat of the referendum for sovereignty association proposed by the Parti-Québecois 
provincial government in May 1980, the intensely nationalist premier René Lévesque still 
enjoyed great popularity and led a determined campaign against Trudeau’s repatriation of the 
Canadian constitution in 1982 that sharpened tensions between Quebec and “the rest of Canada.” 
Trudeau was acutely aware of the need to demonstrate the benefits of federalism, and the 
procurement of the Canadian Patrol Frigates was a clear opportunity. 
Indeed, the procurement of the Canadian Patrol Frigates led to a full-blown political crisis 
which has largely gone unnoticed in Canadian history. While details are scant, it was a widely 
known fact amongst those familiar with the scene in Ottawa that the decision to award the 
contract for the CPFs to SJSDD had nearly led to a revolt of the Quebec caucus of the Liberal 
Party. At this point, there are two different narratives over what occurred. A senior naval official 
recalled that in a desperate final attempt, SCAN lowered its bid to match those of SJSSD within 
a day of the bids being opened. 366 This last-ditch maneuver was deemed to be in violation of the 
conditions of the tender by Treasury Board officials and resulted in SCAN Marine’s bid to be 
 
364 Based on an examination of the results of Canadian federal elections from 1964 to 1980.  
365 Bothwell and Granatstein, Pirouette, 6-7. 
366 Milner, Canada’s Navy, 289.  
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deemed non-compliant.367 However, another equally well-placed participant in the CPF project 
maintained that this did not occur and that the decision to select Saint John Shipbuilding was 
based purely on the merit of its proposal.368 In May 1983, when it became apparent that SJSDD 
was the far superior option, the Cabinet Committee, Foreign and Defence Policy requested an 
additional analysis to be completed by the Committee of Deputy Ministers, Foreign and Defence 
Policy on the distribution of industrial benefits.369 It was evident that Cabinet was aware of the 
impending political fallout given how strongly the MPs from Quebec and the provincial media 
advocated for SCAN to be awarded the contract the warships, particularly since the difference in 
IRB for the province between SJSDD and SCAN’s bids were significant.370 DND officials were 
keenly aware of the political situation and used it to their advantage.  
At the time, there were two other major maritime projects which were in development 
alongside with the CPF program: the Tribal Refit and Update Modernisation Program (TRUMP) 
refit for the DDH 280 destroyers and the construction of the Type 1200 Icebreaker for the 
Department of Transport. The former had been in development since 1977 and was intended to 
convert the four Tribal-class destroyers into area-air defence warships to fulfill a sorely needed 
capability gap. The value of the program was estimated at $1.4 billion and would have provided 
an additional $160 million in industrial benefits to the region in which it was awarded and would 
significantly narrow the IRB difference between the two proposals for the CPFs. The idea to link 
the CPF project and the TRUMP refit was the brainchild of Hans Hendell, a member of the 
 
367 Milner, Canada’s Navy, 289. 
368 Ed Healey. Email to author. September 1, 2020.  
369 Committee of Deputy Minister, “Canadian Patrol Frigate: Additional Analysis,” (June 10, 1983), Vol 213, File 1, 
3, Romeo LeBlanc Fonds, R12069-3185-4-E, LAC. 
370 The difference in IRB between SJSDD and SCAN’s bids for Quebec was $850 million and $400 million for the 
one shipyard and two shipyard options respectively. Annex D - Construction Options and IRB Distributions.  
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CMDO staff.371 Hendell’s proposal was that the region which lost the CPF program would be 
awarded the contract for the DDH 280 destroyer refit while the construction of the icebreakers 
would be reserved for a west coast shipyard.372 This was a politically acceptable solution as it 
ensured that all regions of Canada would benefit from the government’s shipbuilding programs. 
 Upon learning of the decision to award the contract to SJSDD, the Quebec caucus of the 
Liberal Party was furious and threatened to defect from the party, a move which would have 
triggered the collapse of the Trudeau government.373 It did not matter that the province stood to 
gain the most from the distribution of industrial and regional benefits in SJSDD’s plan, the mere 
fact that the Quebec-based SCAN Marine was not the victor of the competition had them livid.374 
In response, a number of measures were adopted by DND officials and recommended to Cabinet 
to placate the party’s Quebec caucus. The TRUMP program was awarded to Litton Canada and 
completed by Davie, a Quebec-based shipyard. Furthermore, it was decided that the construction 
of three of the CPFs would be subcontracted to Versatile Vickers Inc. who then further 
subcontracted MIL shipyards to do the construction to ensure that Quebec received a share of the 
construction jobs. This decision resulted in a myriad of technical and legal problems which 
plagued the project long after the Trudeau government had left power.  
 After the decision to split the construction equally between Quebec and Saint John was 
agreed upon, Rear Admiral Ed Healey, the Project Manager of the CPF project at the time was 
approached by Andre Ouellet, the Minister of Labour about the feasibility of further subdividing 
 
371 Milner, Canada’s Navy, 289. 
372 “Annex G – Public Affairs Consideration of Canadian Patrol Frigate: Additional Analysis.” (June 10, 1983), 
Vol 213, File 1, 1-2, Romeo LeBlanc Fonds, R12069-3185-4-E, LAC. 
373 Milner, Canada’s Navy Milner, Canada’s Navy, 289. 
374 Ed Healey, Email to author, July 26, 2020. By both the value of economic benefits and person/year employment, 
Quebec far exceeded the other provinces and regions of Canada. Refer to Annex D - Construction Options and IRB 
Distributions.  
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the construction of the three Quebec frigates between two shipyards. This was an inadvisable and 
costly proposition which from a project management perspective, made little sense as it added 
additional risks and costs to the program for no tangible gains. However, Minister Ouellet had 
made it clear that if the project were to receive approval from the Treasury Board, it would have 
to be to be implemented.375 This arrangement, which cost an additional $40 million, was 
problematic as no additional funds were given to address this unforeseen complication. SJSDD 
was still expected to complete the project within the agreed to price ceiling and would be held 
liable for the failure to abide to the terms of the contract even if it was not at fault. 376 Fortunately 
for both the navy and SJSDD, any potential crisis was averted when the two Quebec shipyards, 
MIL and Davie, merged together in 1986.  
The split nature of the construction of the Canadian Patrol Frigates nevertheless resulted 
in significant manufacturing delays. Build times for a ship class were generally supposed to 
decrease with each subsequent ship as the builders learned from past experience. When SJSDD 
began the construction of the lead ship in 1987, the drawings of the ships had yet to be finalized 
and as a result, production had to be halted until the designs caught up.377 However, as 
construction of the CPFs was completed simultaneously in two different shipyards, the same 
mistakes were repeated by MIL-Davie when the latter began construction. According to John 
Shepard, the Project Manager at SJSDD, the construction of the CPFs took an additional eight to 
nine million man-hours to complete as a result.378  
 
375 Ed Healey, Email to author, July 27, 2020.  
376 John Shepard interviewed by Roger Chiasson, 7.  
377 Ibid, 8.  
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The decision to subcontract the construction of the CPFs also led to a number of legal 
issues which involved the Prime Contractor (SJSDD), sub-contactor (Versatile Vickers and its 
successor, MIL-DAVIE) and the Canadian government. Between 1983 to 1993, SJSDD (now 
renamed SJSL) initiated a number of claims against the Crown for a sum in excess of $800 
million to recoup additional costs as a result of and not limited to uncompensated design 
changes, interference with subcontractors, unanticipated development work and wrongful 
interpretation of contract. Furthermore, the relationship between SJSL and MIL-Davie had 
deteriorated significantly. 379 In 1991, SJSL sought to terminate the subcontract with MIL-Davie 
for non-performance in addition to the growing cost overruns. Although both matters were 
eventually resolved, they would not have occurred if not for the original decision to subcontract 
the construction of three of the CPFs to a Quebec-based company for political reasons. Learning 
from this experience, the six follow-on frigates of Phase II were awarded to SJSL without 
competition in 1988.  
This episode clearly demonstrated the enormous amount of influence that Quebec 
wielded in Canadian politics as well as the lengths to which the government was willing to go to 
placate the province. The Canadian government had initially paid a $57 million premium for the 
construction of the warships to be completed by two shipyards.380 Paramax Electronics, which 
was responsible for the integration of major electronic systems aboard the CPFs, were also based 
in Quebec to create a high technology industrial capability in the province. However, neither was 
enough for the Quebec Liberal Caucus. To prevent the looming crisis, the Trudeau government 
took additional steps to satisfy the demands of its party members at the cost of significant 
 
379 DND, CPF Project Completion Report, 12.  
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problems downstream. Fortunately for all parties involved, the resolution was to everyone’s 
satisfaction. The Trudeau government survived a major internal crisis while the Province of 
Quebec gained significant economical benefits from the CPF project. MARCOM also received 
far more than they initially bargained for. Not only did they receive six top-of-the-line patrol 
frigates, but the DDH-280 destroyers were modernised and converted to area-air defence 
destroyers to fill an important capability gap.  
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Conclusion – A Marriage of Intersecting Needs 
The first Canadian Patrol Frigate did not enter service until 1992, nearly a full decade 
after the events stated in this thesis and fifteen years after the project was first initiated. Despite 
the long timeline, the procurement of these warships was arguably the most successful Canadian 
military procurement project to date. Not only were twelve state-of-the-art frigates, designed and 
built in Canada to meet the country’s specific needs, delivered to MARCOM but the project was 
completed well below the ceiling price and more important, all of the IRB goals had been 
exceeded.381 To make this an even more important achievement was the difficult circumstances, 
both political and strategic, in which the project began. Over the course of the 1960s and early 
1970s, just when important changes in NATO strategy and the rapid evolution of military 
technology demanded close government attention and the commitment of new resources, 
Canada’s navy had slipped into obsolescence due to more pressing government priorities and 
widespread apathy towards the military. It was not until 1975 that the position of the Trudeau 
government shifted due to a confluence of international and domestic political developments to 
which the procurement of the CPFs provided an effective recourse.  
As this thesis has demonstrated, the fate of Canada’s military and especially its maritime 
service because of the long lead times and substantial resources required to build warships, are 
tied to the support of their political masters. In a democratic society, this was expected; what was 
unexcepted, was the pervasiveness of interference by domestic political considerations in the 
formulation of Canada’s defence policies and the long-lasting impact that they would have. In 
the late 1940s, the RCN began its transition into a specialized ASW fleet due to the strategic 
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situation which the fledging NATO alliance faced. In the years that followed, the state of the 
navy waxed and waned, following the tide of political interest in defence. However, the apathy 
that stemmed from concept of the “fireproof house” and the invulnerability of Canada from 
credible threats meant that the RCN was in a constant struggle to maintain its capabilities in 
ASW in a world that was rapidly evolving.  
In the years which preceded the initiation of the CPF project, MARCOM became mired 
in a decade of darkness that was the result of political mismanagement. The decision by the 
Pearson government to expand social security services in 1964, which was highly popular 
politically, became the primary catalyst for the integration of the armed forces and later, 
unification. The ensuing Unification Crisis, an event manufactured by Paul Hellyer as he 
unilaterally sought to impose his vision on a military establishment that was reluctant to accept 
it, shattered the military and especially the navy. Meanwhile, the first years of Pierre Trudeau’s 
tenure was hardly better for the beleaguered CAF as the new prime minister was hostile to the 
military and its preoccupation with NATO. Instead, he was determined to re-orient the CAF to 
serve the nation’s interests at home at the expense of Canada’s relationship with its allies.  
The fortunes of MARCOM finally changed in 1975, once again for political reasons. 
Relations with the United States, Canada’s principal trade partner, were strained at a time of an 
international economic downturn. The attempts by the Trudeau government to establish closer 
trade relationships with the EEC had been stalled due to the perception that Canada was 
unwilling to contribute to the collective defence of NATO. As Helmut Schmidt made it clear, 
“no tanks, no trade.”382 To sustain the confidence of its allies, given the material state of the 
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CAF, required more than just tanks but also new fighters and warships. The acquisition of the 
latter could not have come at a more opportune time for Trudeau, as in addition to the military 
need for new warships, there was a glaring domestic requirement to both rebuild the shipbuilding 
industry, then in crisis, and to promote broader industrial growth. As noted in Chapter Five, the 
Contract Definition phase of the CPF project was largely shaped by these considerations. From 
the new procurement strategy, which saw Canadian shipbuilders take charge of the project in an 
effort to avoid the political scandals that had been caused of projects managed by DND, to the 
IRBs policies and the significant premiums paid to ensure that the ships would be built in Canada 
with maximum Canadian content, all of this was done to fulfill the political objectives of the 
Trudeau government. The Canadians Patrol Frigates are undeniably the products of an 
intersection of military and political needs.  
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Annex A - Figure 1: Defence Expenditure 1946 - 1984 
 
Fiscal Year Ending 
March 31 
 
 
GNP ($000) 
 
Annual Inflation 
(%) 
Total Federal 
Expenditure 
($000) 
Total DND 
Expenditure 
($000) 
Total Navy 
Expenditure 
($000) 
1950 $ 18,491,000  $ 2,448,616 $ 384,879 $ 73,400 
1951 $ 21,640,000 7.44% $ 2,901,242 $ 782,457 $ 99,900 
1952 $ 24,588,000 10.77% $ 3,732,875 $ 1,415,474 $ 182,400 
1953 $ 25,833,000 -2.08% $ 4,337,276 $ 1,882,418 $ 260,300 
1954 $ 25,918,000 0.00% $ 4,350,522 $ 1,805,915 $ 289,000 
1955 $ 28,528,000 0.00% $ 4,275,363 $ 1,665,969 $ 304,200 
1956 $ 32,058,000 0.71% $ 4,433,128 $ 1,750,112 $ 340,800 
1957 $ 33,513,000 2.82% $ 4,849,035 $ 1,759,426 $ 326,700 
1958 $ 34,777,000 2.74% $ 5,087,411 $ 1,668,463 $ 295,000 
1959 $ 36,846,000 2.00% $ 5,364,040 $ 1,424,741 $ 273,000 
1960 $ 38,359,000 1.31% $ 5,702,861 $ 1,516,572 $ 255,800 
1961 $ 42,927,000 1.29% $ 5,958,101 $ 1,517,531 $ 245,500 
1962 $ 42,927,000 0.00% $ 6,520,646 $ 1,626,104 $ 272,000 
1963 $ 45,978,000 1.91% $ 6,570,342 $ 1,571,044 $ 269,400 
1964 $ 50,280,000 1.88% $ 6,872,402 $ 1,683,471 $ 298,000 
1965 $ 55,364,000 1.84% $ 7,218,275 $ 1,535,635 $ 272,500 
1966 $ 61,828,000 3.01% $ 7,734,796 $ 1,548,447 $ 275,000 
1967 $ 66,109,000 3.51% $ 8,779,681 $ 1,640,378 $ 305,700 
1968 $ 72,586,000 4.52% $ 9,824,081 $ 1,751,598 $ 281,600 
1969 $ 79,815,000 3.78% $ 10,738,956 $ 1,760,796 $ 377,200 
1970 $ 85,685,000 5.21% $ 11,921,595 $ 1,788,428 $ 373,900 
1971 $ 94,450,000 0.99% $ 13,183,144 $ 1,817,876 $ 401,100 
1972 $ 105,234,000 4.90% $ 14,840,865 $ 1,895,175 $ 415,600 
1973 $ 123,560,000 5.61% $ 18,340,000 $ 1,932,246 $ 402,300 
1974 $ 147,528,000 9.29% $ 22,551,000 $ 2,231,983 $ 431,000 
1975 $ 165,343,000 11.74% $ 29,213,000 $ 2,511,873 $ 457,800 
1976 $ 191,857,000 9.78% $ 33,978,000 $ 2,973,680 $ 393,200 
1977 $ 210,189,000 6.27% $ 39,011,000 $ 3,371,199 $ 424,900 
1978 $ 232,211,000 9.01% $ 42,902,000 $ 3,770,980 $ 522,100 
1979 $ 364,279,000 8.55% $ 46,923,000 $ 4,108,027 $ 580,000 
1980 $ 297,556,000 9.71% $ 52,364,000 $ 4,389,289 $ 556,500 
1981 $ 339,797,000 12.20% $ 62,378,000 $ 5,077,076 $ 680,600 
1982 $ 358,302,000 11.30% $ 67,474,000 $ 6,027,729 $ 781,500 
1983 $ 390,310,000 8.24% $ 78,276,000 $ 6,991,964 $ 953,300 
1984 $ 428,500,000 5.49% $ 88,615,000 $ 7,972,241 $ 1,157,300 
* Inflation calculated using Bank of Canada's inflation calculator 
   
** All other figures are from Dan Middlemiss' "Economic Consideration in the Development of the 
Canadian Navy since 1945” in The RCN in Transition: 1910-1985. 
 
 
Ma 136 
 
 
 
Annex A - Figure 2: RCN/MARCOM Expenditure 1961/62 to 1983/84 
 
Fiscal Year 
Ending 
March 31 
 
Total Navy 
Expenditure 
($000) 
Personnel 
($000) 
Percentage of 
Total 
Budget 
Operating 
($000) 
Percentage 
of Total 
Budget 
Capital 
Equipment 
($000) 
Percentage of 
Total 
Budget 
1962  $333,000   $272,000  82%  $61,000  18% 
1963  $332,000   $271,000  82%  $61,000  18% 
1964  $376,000   $295,000  78%  $81,000  22% 
1965  $342,000   $273,000  80%  $69,000  20% 
1966  $345,000   $275,000  80%  $70,000  20% 
1967  $385,000   $306,000  79%  $79,000  21% 
1968  $398,000   $282,000  71%  $116,000  29% 
1969  $377,200   $174,112  46%  $116,095  31%  $86,946  23% 
1970  $373,900   $170,853  46%  $106,694  29%  $96,390  26% 
1971  $401,100   $185,791  46%  $111,648  28%  $103,693  26% 
1972  $415,600   $206,354  50%  $121,103  29%  $88,172  21% 
1973  $402,300   $219,571  55%  $125,449  31%  $57,249  14% 
1974  $431,000   $232,146  54%  $146,899  34%  $51,971  12% 
1975  $457,800   $290,587  63%  $130,770  29%  $36,395  8% 
1976  $393,200   $252,108  64%  $106,057  27%  $35,046  9% 
1977  $424,900   $276,495  65%  $98,601  23%  $49,852  12% 
1978  $522,100   $303,444  58%  $140,753  27%  $77,897  15% 
1979  $580,000   $341,238  59%  $118,938  21%  $119,824  21% 
1980  $556,500   $354,260  64%  $136,490  25%  $65,763  12% 
1981  $680,600   $384,716  57%  $201,717  30%  $94,216  14% 
1982  $781,500   $435,827  56%  $241,283  31%  $104,420  13% 
1983  $953,300   $501,602  53%  $282,015  30%  $169,677  18% 
1984  $1,157,300   $533,245  46%  $291,892  25%  $332,142  29% 
* Figures from FY 1961/62 to FY 1967/68 are the actual expenditures of the RCN/MARCOM 
Source: G.R. Lindsey, “Conference on Maritime Forces,” (January 20-21, 1972), Series X, Vol 68, 1, George Lindsey Fonds, MG 0005, LCMSDS.  
** All other figures are from Dan Middlemiss' "Economic Consideration in the Development of the Canadian Navy since 1945” in The RCN in Transition: 
1910-1985. 
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Annex B – SJSDD vs SCAN Proposal Evaluation Summary 
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Annex C – Ship Characteristics 
SHIP CHARACTERISTICS 
 PATROL FRIGATE SOVEREIGNTY SHIP 
S
H
IP
 P
A
R
T
IC
U
L
A
R
S
*
 
DISPLACEMENT –   DEEP (TONS) 3965 3200 
DIMENSIONS (FT) LENGTH 
OVERALL/WATERLINE 
                                 BEAM (WATERLINE) 
                                 DRAFT 
418/394 
47.5 
15.5 
374/356 
42.0 
14.4 
PROPULSION         TYPE 
    (SHP)                CRUISING POWER 
                BOOST POWER 
COGOG 
2 x 5000 
1 x 35000 
COGOG 
2 x 5000 
1 x 35000 
SPEED                MAX – SEA STATE 2 
                          MAX – SEA STATE 5 
28 
24.5 
29 
23 
RADIATED NOISE LEVEL EQUAL TO DDH 280 GREATER THAN DDH 280 
RANGE AT 15 KTS. 4500 N.M. 4500 N.M 
FRESH/FROZEN/GENERAL STORES (DAYS) 30/45/90 30/30/30 
S
E
N
S
O
R
S
 
UNDERWATER 
C
O
M
B
A
T
 
TOWED ARRAY 
HULL MOUNTED SONAR 
E
N
F
O
R
C
E
M
E
N
T
 
HULL MOUNTED SONAR 
ABOVE WATER AIR AIR SEARCH AIR SEARCH (REDUCED) 
ABOVE WATER SURFACE 
SURFACE SEARCH 
NAVIGATION RADAR NAVIGATION RADAR 
ABOVE WATER FIRE CONTROL SURFACE & AIR 
SURFACE & AIR 
(REDUCED) 
ELECTRONICS SUPPORT MEASURES (ESM) FULL ESM OUTFIT ESM (REDUCED) 
OTHER   
W
E
A
P
O
N
S
 
UNDERWATER  
 
TORPEDO TUBES 
SHORT RANGE A/S 
          ROCKET 
 
ANTI AIR MISSILES  
ANTI SURFACE MISSILES  
GUN 1 X 76 MM 
2 X 20 MM 
1 X 76 MM 
2 X 20 MM 
ELECTRONICS COUNTER MEASURES 
(ECM) 
CHAFF/INFRA-
RED/JAMMER  
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (CCS) INTEGRATED CCS DATA DISPLAY SYSTEM 
COMMUNICATIONS MEETS NATO REQ’TS COMM’N (REDUCED) 
HELICOPTER SEA KING SEA KING 
ICE CAPABILITY BRASH ICE BRASH ICE 
ACCOMMODATION 205 185 
SAILAWAY COST     1977/ 78 * * $ 139 M $ 93 M 
PROJECT COST  6 SHIPS                  1977/78 * * $ 1585 M $ 1072 M 
 
     * - ALL SHIP PARTICULARS ARE NOMINAL, SUBJECT TO REFINEMENT 
     ** - SAILAWAY COST IS THE COST OF ADDING ONE FULLY OUTFITTED SHIP TO THE PROJECT 
             COST DOES NOT INCLUDE HELICOPTER OR AVIATION STORES/SPARES 
Reproduction of “Figure C of Annex B – Ship Characteristics of Maritime Forces Surface Requirements 
(DND-8-77DP),” Vol 74, File 11, 111, Barney Danson Fonds, R13905-1415-0-E, LAC.
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Annex D – Construction Options and IRB Distributions 
 
Project Alternatives ($M 83/84)      
Contractor Options 
(ATL - QC - WEST) Premium (M)* 
Total Cost 
Difference (M)** Atlantic (M) Quebec (M) Ontario (M) West (M) 
SJSDD 6-0-0 $0 $0 $877 $710 $695 $91 
SJSDD 3-3-0 $57 $57 $678 $966 $695 $91 
SJSDD 2-2-2 $93 $93 $611 $883 $695 $277 
SCAN 0-6-0 $0 $472 $149 $1569 $669 $148 
SCAN 3-3-0 $58 $530 $416 $1360 $669 $148 
SCAN 2-2-2 $132 $604 $336 $1286 $669 $376 
* Relative to the cheapest option for each contractor      
** Relative to the lowest cost option (Building all six ships in Saint John)     
          
Source: “Briefing for the Honourable Romeo LeBlanc.” (June 20, 1983), Vol 213 File 1, Romeo LeBlanc Fonds, R12069-3185-4-E, LAC.  
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